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DYNAMIC PATENT GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE 
AND THE UNITED STATES: THE MYRIAD EXAMPLE 
 




This Article examines the emerging elements of a new 
model for patent governance.  It is divided into four parts.  In 
Section One, we develop a model of dynamic patent governance.  
This model extends the theoretical framework of network 
governance, to explain the emergence of networks in the decision-
making infrastructure for the public and private actors in the patent 
system.  Dynamic patent governance widens this theoretical 
framework in two key ways. First, dynamic patent governance, 
within its formal dimensions, is based on the idea that 
heterogeneous administrative actors regulate the grant and 
enforcement of patents.  This challenges a perspective that sees 
patent examination agencies as the sole actor of importance within 
the patent system.  Second, dynamic patent governance, within its 
informal dimensions, highlights that the patent administrative 
regime is shaped by the fluid relationship of diverse actors to these 
heterogeneous administrative actors.  Section Two explores the 
consequences of a more dynamic patent governance context.  
Section Three applies this model to explore the recent Myriad 
litigation in the United States and Europe.  Section Four focuses on 
some particular challenges that dynamic patent governance poses 
to: (1) the impulse to centralize patent administration and litigation; 
and (2) the efficiency of the patent system. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
It started out in a typical manner.  On August 12, 1994, a patent 
application was filed in the United States Patent Office (USPTO) that 
claimed as its primary invention, a DNA1 isolated sequence for what 
 *  Kali Murray, Assistant Professor, Marquette University Law School.  Equal contribution 
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like to thank my research assistant Andrew Spillane for his steadfast dedication to this complex 
project.   
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 1 DNA is the term used for the chemical compound known as deoxyribonucleic acid, which 
serves as a basic source of genetic material.  2-D ATTORNEY’S DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE D-
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has been identified as the BRCA1 gene, as well as a method for 
identifying that specified gene in a comparative sample.2  One year 
later, on August 12, 1995, a similar patent application was filed at the 
European Patent Office (EPO).3  Other patent applications swiftly 
followed, including a patent application filed in December 1995, for 
another key isolated DNA sequence, identified as the BRCA2 sequence, 
as well as a method for identifying that specified gene in a comparative 
sample.4  Indeed, patent applications for the same inventions have been 
filed in jurisdictions other than the United States and Eu
The Myriad patents (called so because they are in large part owned 
by one corporation, Myriad Genetics, Inc., (Myriad) located in Salt 
Lake City, Utah), have prompted strong reactions in jurisdictions all 
over the world, including the United States, Europe, and Australia.  
33566 (Matthew Bender & Co. 2009). 
 2 The patent application on the BRCA1 gene was initially filed on August 12, 1994.  U.S. 
Patent No. 289,211 (filed Aug. 12, 1994) [hereinafter ‘289 application].  After a number of 
successively filed continuation-in-part applications, U.S. Patent Number 5,747,282 was issued on 
May 8, 1998.  U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 (filed June 8, 1995) (issued May 8, 1998); see also U.S. 
Patent No. 5,693,473 (filed June 7, 1995) (issued Dec. 7, 1997).  A number of methods for the 
process of detecting specific mutations in the BRCA1 gene, as well as methods for comparing the 
individualized tumor and non-tumor BRCA1 gene sequence of a patient sample, originated from 
the now abandoned ‘289 patent application.  See U.S. Patent No. 570,999 (filed June 7, 1995) 
(issued Jan. 20, 1998); U.S. Patent No. 5,710, 001 (filed June 7, 1995) (issued Jan. 20, 1998); 
U.S. Patent No. 5,753,441 (filed Jan. 5, 1996) (issued May 19, 1998). 
 3 European Patent No. 705,902 (filed Aug. 12, 1995). 
 4 The patent application that identified the BRCA2 sequence was initially filed on December 
18, 1995.  U.S. Patent No. 573,779 (filed Dec. 18, 1995) [hereinafter ‘779 patent application]; 
U.S. Patent No. 5,837,492 (filed Apr. 29, 1996) (issued Nov. 17, 1998).  A method for comparing 
the individualized tumor and non-tumor BRCA2 gene sequence of a patient sample also 
originated from the now abandoned ‘779 patent application.  U.S. Patent No. 6,033,857 (filed 
Mar. 20, 1998) (issued Mar. 7, 2000). 
 5 Myriad filed for a patent under the Patent Cooperation Treaty for the BRCA1 gene 
sequence in February 1996.  WO/1996/005307 (filed on Feb. 22, 1996).  The patent application 
entered into a national sequence in Korea, Finland, Mexico, and New Zealand. 
(WO/1996/005307) 17q-Linked Breast and Ovarian Cancer Susceptibility Gene, WIPO, 
http://www.wipo.int/portal/index.html.en (search WIPO for “WO/1996/005307”; then follow 
“(WO/1996/05307) 17-q LINKED BREAST AND OVARIAN CANCER . . .” hyperlink; then 
click “National Phase” tab) (last visited Apr. 3, 2010).  A patent was issued in New Zealand in 
1998, but it was rejected in Korea in 2003.  Id.  Likewise, Myriad, along with listed co-inventors, 
including the Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania, HSC Research Development Limited 
Partnership, and Endo Recherle, Inc., filed for a patent under the Patent Cooperation Treaty, for 
the BRCA2 gene sequence in 1996.  See WO/1997/022,689 (filed Dec. 17, 1996).  The patent 
application entered into a national phase application in Canada, Mexico, Japan, and New Zealand. 
(WO/1997/022689) Chromosome 13-Linked Breast Cancer Susceptibility Gene, WIPO, 
http://www.wipo.int/portal/index.html.en (search WIPO for “WO/1997/022689”; then follow 
(“WO/1997/022689) CHROMOSOME 13-LINKED BREAST CANCER SUSCEPTIBILITY. . .” 
hyperlink; then click “National Phase” tab) (last visited Apr. 3, 2010).  A patent was issued from 
New Zealand in 2000.  Id. 
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These patents have prompted controversies because they seem so 
personal, in that these inventions cover such things as the breast and 
ovarian cancer genes, BRCA1 and BRCA2, and their mutations, as well 
as diagnostic and therapeutic applications based on the gene’s sequence.  
One patient, Lisabeth Ceriani, explaining her opposition to gene patents, 
stated, “gene patents,” are “turning our bodies into commerce.”6  Thus, 
the various Myriad debates have raised significant moral and practical 
conundrums for patent law. 
Equally interesting (but less commented upon) is that in addition to 
all of its guises, Myriad provides a compelling example of a changed 
policy environment in patent law.  The Myriad debates take place in a 
policy environment in which calls for patent reform are common.  
Congress once again squabbles over whether to create a new post-grant 
review proceeding while across the pond7, the European Union has 
resumed the debate whether to create an EU-wide patent8 along with a 
 6 Elizabeth Weise, Is it Unfair to Patent Genes? Successful ACLU Lawsuit Against a Bio-
Tech Company Has Some Celebrating, Others Alarmed, USA TODAY, Apr. 10, 2010, at 10B. 
 7 See Patent Reform Act of 2011, S. 23, 112th Cong. (2011); Patent Reform Act of 2010, S. 
515, 111th Cong. §§ 321-36 (2010); Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. §§ 321-
36 (2009).  For further discussion of patent law, see Angela Payne James et al., Recent 
Developments in Patent Law and the Potential Impact on Patent Litigation, in PATENT 
LITIGATION 2009 249, 287 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, & Literary Property Course Handbook 
Series No. 982, 2009). 
 8 The Belgian Presidency made European Union patents a priority.  See PROGRAMME OF THE 
BELGIAN PRESIDENCY OF THE EU COUNCIL (2010), http://www.eutrio.be/files/bveu/media/docu 
ments/Programme_EN.pdf.  Similar major initiatives by former presidencies have failed due to 
stagnating negotiations.  See, e.g., Press Release, European Parliament, Swedish Ministers 
Outline Council Presidency Priorities (Sept. 4, 2009), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu 
/news/expert/infopress_page/008-60075-244-09-36-901-20090901IPR60074-01-09-2009-2009 
false/default_en.htm (discussing legislative work on the community patent as a priority of the 
Swedish Presidency of the European Union); Press Release, Swedish Presidency of the European 
Union, Breakthrough for EU Patent During the Swedish Presidency, (Dec. 4, 2009), available at 
http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/12407/a/136614 (discussing the EU Member States’ agreement 
on a common European Union patent court that will try cases on both the European Union patent 
and existing European patents).  Unfortunately, the Belgian Presidency also failed to advance a 
common patent agenda.  As a result, a number of EU Member States decided to launch a 
procedure for so-called “enhanced cooperation” which permits a group of at least nine Member 
States to create new EU legislation without the cooperation of all the Member States.  See Letter 
by 10 Member States to the European Commission to Commissioner Michel Barnier, (Dec. 7, 
2010), available at http://www.fd.nl/csFdArtikelen/WEB-HFD/y2010/m12/d08/20892331.  The 
European Commission then submitted a proposal for enhanced cooperation of a unitary EU 
patent. Commission Proposal for a Council Decision Authorizing Enhanced Cooperation in the 
Area of the Creation of Unitary Patent Protection, COM (2010) 0790 final (Dec. 14, 2010).  
“Enhanced cooperation” is also supported by the European Parliament and the Council of the 
European Union.  Press Release, European Parliament gives go-ahead for enhanced cooperation, 
(Feb. 15, 2011), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/en/pressroom/content/20110215IPR1 
3680/html/EU-patent-Parliament-gives-go-ahead-for-enhanced-cooperation; Press Release 
7506/11, Council authorizes enhanced cooperation on creation of unitary patent protection, 
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centralized court to hear patent disputes.  These debates, along with 
recurrent controversies, such as Myriad, while often viewed in isolation 
from each other and seemingly preoccupied by different concerns, 
actually reflect a shared experience in different jurisdictions—a 
reevaluation, if not an outright crisis—over how public authorities 
regulate the grant and subsequent enforcement of patents. 
Why, at present, does the ability of administrators, to effectively 
regulate patents, seem to be compromised?  The obvious answer, critics 
contend, is that patent administrators are failing in their most basic 
tasks. Specifically, critics claim that patent administrators are failing to 
examine patent applications quickly, and, if those patents are actually 
examined, issuing poor quality patents.9  Moreover, patent 
administrators often cannot stop a patentee from engaging in behavior 
that may distort the functioning of a market, such as patent thickets,10 
restrictive licensing techniques, and the litigation claims of so-called 
patent trolls.11 
The solutions are seemingly easy.  Provide more funding and hire 
(March 10, 2011), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=PRES/ 
11/54&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
 9 The deficient “quality” of patents has been cited as an ongoing problem in the current 
patent system.  Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, The Political Economy of the Patent System, 87 
N.C. L. REV. 1341, 1343 (2009) (citing Bronwyn H. Hall & Dietmar Harhoff, Post-Grant 
Reviews in the U.S. Patent System: Design Choices and Expected Impact, 19 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J 989, 996–97 (2004)).  See Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 
17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763, 765 (2002) (suggesting that critics of the Patent Office assert that 
the patents granted by the same are of poor quality and “facially” invalid or broader than the 
actual innovation disclosed in the patent application).  Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie has 
sought to measure how patent quality can be determined.  See Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la 
Potterie, The Quality Factor in Patent Systems 12 (ECARES, Working Paper No. 2010-027, 
2010), https://dipot.ulb.ac.be:8443/dspace/bitstream/2013/59650/1/2010-027-VANPOTTESLBE 
RGHE-qualityfactor.pdf (“Quality is defined as the extent to which patent systems comply with 
their own patentability conditions in a transparent way.  It is therefore possible to gauge quality 
through a two-layer framework: the first layer would be composed of the legal standards that 
describe the patentability conditions of a national patent system.  The second layer is 
characterized by the operation design put in place to meet those standards.”). 
 10 A patent thicket can be defined as “a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights 
that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology.”  
See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-
Setting, in 7 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119-50 (Adam Jaffe, et al., eds., 2001) 
(analyzing patent pools and cross-licenses as a solution for patent thickets, in particular in a 
standard setting context). 
 11 The term “patent troll” is a pejorative term used for an entity that enforces its patents 
against one or more alleged infringers in a manner generally considered rather aggressive or 
opportunistic and which often does not have an intention to manufacture or market the patented 
invention.  Therefore, a less pejorative label for this type of entities is “non-practicing entity.”  
See John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? The 
Characteristics of the Most Litigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 101 (2009). 
MURRAY-ZIMMEREN_TO_IZRAILEV_19.2 4/18/2011  4:49:00 PM 
292 CARDOZO J. OF INT’L & COMP. LAW [Vol. 19:287 
 
more examiners to examine patents quickly.12  Eliminate the ability of 
patent trolls to bring superfluous claims.13  Impose mandatory licensing 
rules14 or use new types of licensing models to provide relief from post-
enforcement control by patentees.15 
However, patent reform debates in Europe, the United States and 
elsewhere are not simply about improving the functioning of patent 
regulators.  Indeed, various controversies, of which Myriad is one, 
indicate that a broader set of questions is at play.  Whose interests does 
patent law serve?  Patent-holders?  Competitors?  The public?  Who is 
in the best position to address these respective interests?  The 
legislature?  The executive?  The judiciary?  Is there a role for the patent 
community in this respect?  And if so, how could the patent community 
optimally exercise this role?  These practical controversies have led to 
even broader philosophical inquiries.  Is patent law still fulfilling the 
most basic functions of law?  Has it reached its limits?  Are other 
models more appropriate in an ever-changing technological 
environment?16 
 12 Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, supra note 9, at 765 (stating 
that “[s]everal commentators have noted that the Patent Office is being asked to perform miracles 
because it operates under significant budgetary constraints.”).  See Arti K. Rai, Addressing the 
Patent Gold Rush: The Role of Deference to PTO Patent Denials, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 199, 
218 (2000) (noting that one straightforward patent reform proposal involves increasing the 
number and quality of patent examiners). 
 13 Christopher A. Cotropia, The Individual Inventor Motif in the Age of the Patent Troll, 12 
YALE J.L. & TECH. 52, 62 (2010) (discussing patent trolls and hold-up, a term referring to the 
excessive licensing amounts patent trolls charge for the use of their patents, as a focus in modern 
patent reform); Paul J. Heald, Optimal Remedies for Patent Infringement: A Transactional Model, 
45 HOUS. L. REV. 1165, 1199 (2008) (“To conclude, one thrust of current patent reform efforts 
focuses on remedies, with the most frequent object of discussing being the ‘patent troll,’ the non-
exploiting owner of a patent whose business model is based on extracting licensing fees from 
unintentional infringers.”). 
 14 Joseph P. Bauer, Refusals to Deal with Competitors by Owners of Patents and Copyrights: 
Reflections on the Image Technical and Xerox Decisions, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 1211, 1243–44 
(2006) (analyzing how a patent owner may be able to unfairly extend its monopoly through 
contracts and licensing agreements, while discussing the mandatory sales and licensing remedy as 
problematic). 
 15 See GENE PATENTS AND COLLABORATIVE LICENSING MODELS: PATENT POOLS, 
CLEARINGHOUSES AND LIABILITY REGIMES (Geertrui van Overwalle, ed., 2009) (analyzing 
different types of licensing models as a solution to patent thickets and patent hold-outs); Geertrui 
van Overwalle et al., Models for facilitating access to patents on genetic inventions, 7 NAT. REV. 
GENET., 143, 143-48 (2006) (reviewing different models, research exemption, licensing, 
collaborative licensing models, compulsory licensing to facilitate access to genetic inventions); 
Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting, 
in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119-50 (Adam Jaffe, et al., eds., 2001) (analyzing 
patent pools and cross-licenses as a solution for patent thickets, in particular in a standard-setting 
context). 
 16 Geertrui Van Overwalle and Esther van Zimmeren, Functions and Limits of Patent Law, in 
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These questions are difficult ones.  The variety of these questions 
exposes a key challenge to how patent law will be governed in a new 
era. The old model of patent regulation was, in a word, static.  It relied 
on seeing the patent agency as a simple registrar of patents, with a 
limited ability to consider broader issues related to patent law and 
without further interference from other administrative actors or civil 
society.  The deepening criticism suggests that this static model of 
governance is clearly deficient.  What then should be the new model? 
Hints of a new governance model have emerged.  Academic and 
policy innovators have offered different “big picture” views of the 
newly emerging patent governance.  For example, Dr. Francis Gurry, 
the Director General of the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO) has identified how patent policy-making has emerged from 
what he terms a “uni-modular system,” where patent law’s own policies 
drove the interests of regulators and stakeholders, to a multi-polar 
policy-making system, where the patent system considers and is 
impacted by other policy making areas, such as public health and 
antitrust.17  Elsewhere, James Boyle has argued that all intellectual 
property law, including patent law, should embrace a greater concern 
for democratic decision-making by intellectual property regulators, as 
well as a greater institutional diversity in intellectual property decision-
making (a process Boyle terms “cultural environmentalism”).18  While 
both Gurry and Boyle speculate about different aspects of a new 
governance model for the patent system, their work has not offered a 
coherent and detailed view on the new patent governance model. 
This Article builds on insights expressed elsewhere in our 
individual scholarship on governance, as well as in the scholarship of 
others.  We seek to define what patent governance looks like now and 
what we think it should look like in the future.  We contend that patent 
FACING THE LIMITS OF THE LAW 415, 424-30 (Erik Claes, et al., eds., 2009) (analyzing the failure 
of patent law to fulfill its regulatory function, its symbolic function and its “legal guarantees” 
function). 
 17 Francis Gurry, The Evolution of Technology and Markets and the Management of 
Intellectual Property Rights, 72 CHI. KENT L. REV. 369, 378 (1996) (discussing the increasing 
need for intellectual property law to address other areas of public policy and vice versa).  See 
Peter K. Yu, A Tale of Two Development Agendas, 35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 465, 527 (2009) 
(examining the impact of public health considerations on the treaty framework of TRIPS). 
 18 James Boyle, Cultural Environmentalism and Beyond, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 6 
(2007) (defining cultural environmentalism as “an idea, an intellectual and practical movement, 
that is supposed to be a solution to a set of political and theoretical problems . . . a set of mental 
models, economic nostrums, and property theories that each have a public domain shaped hole at 
the center”); JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND 
240-43 (2008) (proposing that the achievement of genuine democratic politics of intellectual 
property requires an institutionally diverse debate). 
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governance is gradually becoming—and should become—more 
dynamic.  This means including more diverse administrative actors, 
from varied policy contexts, and enabling more interaction between 
these administrative actors, on the one hand, and an active public, on the 
other hand. 
In Part Two, we will describe the contours of the emerging model 
of “dynamic” patent governance.  In Part Three, we will analyze the 
potential consequences associated with the principles of dynamic 
governance.  In Part Four, we will examine the lessons of the recent 
Myriad gene patent litigation in the United States and Europe in order to 
analyze how dynamic patent governance works in practice.  Finally, 
utilizing lessons from the first four sections, in Section Five, we draw 
normative conclusions as to the impact of a model of dynamic patent 
governance on the particular challenges that currently confront the 
institutional design of the patent regime. 
This Article proceeds from a particular perspective; we seek to 
integrate governance debates that occur and have occurred in both the 
United States and Europe.  A common challenge has been that many 
academic and reform debates on patent law have carried on in isolation 
from each other.  Perhaps, the best way to describe this situation is to 
resort to the old metaphor of the blind man and the elephant.19  We all 
see the various administrative elements of the systems that we are 
familiar with, but in doing so, cannot perceive the larger picture: the 
changing nature of patent governance.  Aware of this problem, this 
Article attempts to provide a more complete view of patent governance. 
II. DYNAMIC PATENT GOVERNANCE: THE MODEL 
A theory of dynamic patent governance seeks to address the impact 
of two key changes in patent law: (1) the emergence of a more diverse 
set of institutional actors; and (2) the emergence of a more diverse set of 
stakeholders in patent law.  These two changes reflect the relevance of a 
concept that has been explored more thoroughly in other regulatory 
contexts, such as environmental20 and international law—the 
development of the theoretical model of network governance.21  Put 
 19 A famous western adaptation by John Godfrey Saxe, describes a tale of six blind men who 
traveled to see an elephant; each encountered a separate portion of the elephant along the way and 
vehemently disagreed as to the proper account of the elephant based on their isolated and varying 
experiences.  JOHN G. SAXE, CLEVER STORIES OF MANY NATIONS 59-64 (1865). 
 20 Peter M. Haas, Addressing the Global Governance Deficit, 4 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 1, 13 
(2004). 
 21 Id. at 13. 
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simply, the theoretical model of network governance is used to explain 
how a variety of autonomous actors operate in interdependent 
relationships—without necessarily being restricted to a hierarchical 
relationship—to govern the systems in which they participate.22  The 
underlying idea of network governance is that the effective functioning 
and legitimacy of the system “as a whole” is more than the mere 
aggregation of individual public organizations’ performances.23  Thus, 
network governance differs significantly from classic theories of 
regulation, which tend to focus solely on the formal institutions of 
government and less on the interrelationships between formal 
institutions and informal actors outside of those institutions.24 
We observe that the idea of network governance is emerging 
within the context of patent law, and extend this model in two additional 
ways.  First, we claim that within its formal dimensions, the patent 
system should be analyzed as a whole, focusing on the roles played by 
various actors, rather than the individual institutional actors themselves.  
This focus on roles, rather than individual actors, also greatly facilitates 
comparison of governance systems between different jurisdictions.25 
As we examine the roles of institutional actors, we contend that the 
formal dimensions of the patent system have been changed by the 
emergence of heterogeneous administrative and judicial actors.  
Heterogeneity of the patent system suggests that more than one 
administrative actor can and will seek to regulate the grant and 
 22 Orly Lobel, relying on a variety of recent scholarship, has identified a number of key 
characteristics of network governance, including: (1) participation by a variety of different actors 
at various stages of the legal process; (2) collaboration by these actors through the regulatory 
process; (3) institutional diversity that emphasizes a multitude of legal values in decision-making; 
(4) decentralization of power through state and regulatory actors; (5) the integration of different 
policy domains; (6) flexibility in regulatory solutions; (7) dynamism in policy outcomes that 
leads to more frequent revision of regulatory goals; and (8) a policy commitment to orchestrating 
the different actors within a networked system.  See generally Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The 
Fall of Regulation and The Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. 
REV. 342 (2004-2005). 
 23 Susana Borrás, The Governance of the European Patent System: Effective and Legitimate?, 
35 ECON. & SOC’Y 594, 598 (2006). 
 24 See Richard Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
437, 439-43 (2003) (analyzing major theoretical frameworks associated with the development of 
administrative law in the United States).  See generally PAUL CRAIG, EU ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
(2006) (analyzing the development of administrative law within the context of the European 
Union). 
 25 Our examination of this model in the following sections takes place primarily within the 
context of a comparative framework between the European Union and the United States, as is 
demonstrated by our primary reliance on these models throughout our text.  We believe, however, 
that our model has relevance across diverse patent regimes, and so our examples in the footnote 
citations refer to a variety of different patent regimes. 
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enforcement of patents.  Until recently, analyses of patent 
administrative law have exclusively focused on the role of the patent 
examiner in the issuance of a given patent.  This approach ignores the 
impact that other regulators, like other agencies or subsequent judicial 
actors, may have on the ongoing evolution of patent law.  Such an 
approach obscures a key insight, namely that, regulation of patent law is 
undertaken at multiple administrative sites during the life of an issued 
patent.26 
Second, we believe that, consistent with the idea of network 
governance, the informal dimension of the patent regime has been 
impacted by a plurality of actors that actively influence legislation and 
policy-making, such as states, companies, national or regional agencies, 
international organizations, such as the WIPO and World Trade 
Organization (WTO), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as 
patient advocacy groups, human rights organizations, medical 
associations and scientific organizations.  These actors are likely to have 
a number of instruments at their disposal, such as persuasion, economic 
pressure, norm creation and manipulation.27  We deepen this theoretical 
insight, however, by examining the specific fissures between informal 
actors in the patent regime.  In particular, we claim that the emergence 
of “new” actors on the patent scene, such as NGOs (whom we 
collectively term the “patent civil society”), brings them into conflict 
with the more settled stakeholders of the “epistemic” communities that 
have traditionally driven patent policy-decision-making. 
Ultimately, we argue that the emergence of these trends—
heterogeneous administrative actors and maturing patent 
communities—has led to a more dynamic administrative context for 
patent law.  Therefore, it is vital to explore the patterns of formal and 
informal interactions among the wide variety of public and private 
actors that constitute the patent governance system, both at inter-
organizational and inter-personal levels.  We first explore the formal 
dimension in terms of the heterogeneous nature of the patent system.  
We next describe a maturing informal dimension in which different 
types of stakeholder communities seek to weigh in on the decision-
 26 This heterogeneity framework has been previously introduced within the context of the 
United States.  See generally Kali Murray, The Cooperation of Many Minds: Domestic Patent 
Reform in a Heterogeneous Regime, 48 IDEA: INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 289 (2008) (using 
doctrines of administrative framework, such as the Chevron deference framework, that are 
specific to the jurisprudential context of the United States, in discussing the heterogeneous 
framework).  These doctrines are not discussed in this Article, as we are examining these issues 
within a comparative framework. 
 27 Scott Burris et al., Nodal Governance, 30 AUST. J. LEG. PHIL. 30, 31 (2005). 
MURRAY-ZIMMEREN_TO_IZRAILEV_19.2 4/18/2011  4:49:00 PM 
2011] DYNAMIC PATENT GOVERNANCE 297 
making by the formal actors. 
A. Dynamic Patent Governance: The Formal Dimension and 
Heterogeneity 
Susana Borrás defines the “formal” dimension of network 
governance as “the set of constitutive regulations that govern the 
interactions between the public [actors] that grant, control and rule 
about individual patents and their use, abuse and infringement in the 
market.”28 While patent literature has often focused on the role of the 
examining agency, the concept of heterogeneity examines a broader 
range of public actors.  A heterogeneous perspective of institutional 
actors within the patent governance system starts with the assumption 
that the roles of institutional actors may be consistent across patent 
administrative systems.  Two kinds of roles are possible.  First, primary 
actors are tasked with regulating the resource on an ongoing basis.  
Second, secondary actors can be tasked to regulate a resource, by either 
replicating the role of the primary actor in a narrower content area, or by 
using their expertise derived from other content areas to impact patent 
law.  Thus, actors within the context of patent law have to navigate an 
increasingly complex formal dimension.  Diagram 1 provides a visual 
depiction of the primary actors (legislators, examiners, and reviewers), 
discussed in Part II.A.1, and their relationship to the secondary actors, 
discussed in Part II.A.2. 
Primary Actors (legislators, 
examiners, reviewers)
Replicative Actors (supplem
ents role of 
prim















































 28 Borrás, supra note 23, at 598. 
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1. The Formal Dimension: Primary Actors 
We first examine the role of primary actors within a patent 
governance system.  Primary actors (legislators, examiners, and 
reviewers) fulfill three key tasks in a patent administrative system.  
First, the legislative actor creates the regulatory framework for the other 
primary and secondary actors.29  Second, the primary administrative 
actor determines whether the patent should be granted and whether an 
issued patent is valid or infringed.  As such, patent reform efforts have 
typically focused on changing the behavior of the primary actors that 
fulfill the role of issuing a patent or determining that it infringes on a 
pre-existing one.  Finally, the administrative and judicial review of a 
patent after its grant is the third major task of a patent system. 
a. Primary Actors: The Legislator 
The legislature plays an intermittent but important role within the 
context of patent policy-making.  It sets the roles of the other actors 
through its grants of regulatory powers, which require considerable 
institutional, philosophical, economic, and policy choices.  
Indeed, legislators are often responsible for the increased 
importance of the secondary actors.  For instance, in the United States, 
congressional attempts to regulate patent law have led to the growing 
importance of a number of secondary actors.  For example, Congress 
expanded the roles of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the 
context of patent drug regulation in 1984;30 the United States 
International Trade Commission (USITC) in 1988, in the context of 
import litigation;31 the United States Trade Representative (USTR) in 
 29 As to the role of the legislative actors, this Article expands on the discussion contained in 
Kali Murray’s article, The Cooperation of Many Minds, which emphasized the role of the 
legislative actor as an initiator of the institutional design of the heterogeneous regime. Murray, 
supra note 26, at 299.  The role of the legislature, however, was seen as limited to the initial 
design.  Id. at 299.  Here, we emphasize that the legislative actor actually serves as a node within 
the patent governance system. 
 30 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 
Stat. 1585 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 n.355, 360cc (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2006); 35 U.S.C. 
§§ 156, 271, 282 (2006)). See Mary E. Wictorowicz, Emergent Patterns in the Regulation of 
Pharmaceuticals: Institutions and Interests in the United States, Canada, Britain, and France, 28 
J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 615, 631–36 (2003) (discussing FDA oversight); Devesh Srivastava, 
The Food and Drug Administration and Patent Law at a Crossroad: The Listing of Polymorph 
Patents as a Barrier to Generic Drug Entry, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 339 (2004) (examining the 
role of the FDA in deciding the entry of generic drugs into the market is concerned with 
pharmaceutical and therapeutic considerations). 
 31 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2006); Sapna Kumar, The Other Patent Agency: Congressional 
Regulation of the ITC, 61 FLA. L. REV. 529, 533 (2009) (asserting that the International Trade 
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1988, in the context of negotiating intellectual property agreements;32 
and the United States Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) in the context of the review of patented 
pharmaceutical settlement systems.33 
Legislatures, with their increased responsiveness to different 
stakeholders often play a crucial intervening role in the patent system.  
Legislative interference, however, bears significant risks.  Legislative 
intervention is sporadic, in a temporal and ideological sense.  In a 
temporal sense, different legislators may often add language to an 
enacting statute over time without consideration as to its textual 
consistency and clarity.  A famous example of this in the United States 
is the Copyright Act of 1976, which has lost significant textual cohesion 
over time.34  A European example is the EU Trademark Regulation, 
which was substantially amended over time and, as a result, had to be 
re-codified in the interest of “clarity and rationality.”35  Likewise, two 
ideological risks present themselves.  First, legislators may undertake 
significant reform in response to the narrow concerns of epistemic elite 
without taking into account broader public concerns.  Second, this risk 
can be compounded further if legislators are subject to industry pressure 
on a given issue.  Each of these risks can undermine the credibility of a 
patent regime to the larger public. 
b. Primary Actors: The Examining Administrator 
The most basic task of any patent system is to provide inventors 
Commission undertakes patent assessment under § 1337); Colleen Chien, Patently Protectionist? 
An Empirical Analysis of Patent Cases at the International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 63, 110 (2008) (contending that the International Trade Commission may create patent 
policy inconsistent with precedents of the Supreme Court). 
 32 See, e.g., Omnibus Trade Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1302, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988) 
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2242 (2006)); Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, “Special 
301:” Its Requirements, Implementation, and Significance, 13 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 259 (1990) 
(describing the United States Trade Representative’s authority to put countries it perceives to 
have inadequate intellectual property laws on watch lists under “Special 301” powers provided by 
the Omnibus Trade Act of 1988). 
 33 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006); Lisa M. Ferri & Monique A. Morneault, Reverse Payment Patent 
Settlements: The Interplay of Antitrust and Patent Policies, 20 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 14, 
16-17 (2008) (discussing the FTC’s power to review patent litigation settlements under the 
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act); Murray, supra note 26, at 
314, 327 (discussing the responsibility given to the FTC to analyze the antitrust and consumer 
consequences associated with the grant of a patent under section 5 of the Clayton Antitrust Act 
and the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA)). 
 34 See, e.g., David Nimmer, Codifying Copyright Comprehensibly, 51 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1233 
(2004) (examining the problematic revisions of the Copyright Act of 1976). 
 35 Council Regulation 207/2009, 2009 O.J. (L78) 1. 
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with a functional way to obtain a patent.  Three models exist as to how 
to obtain a patent.  The patentee can register a claim on an invention, 
rely on another examination conducted by another country or regional 
organization, or submit to a substantive examination.  A patent registry 
is the simplest choice.  A patent registry involves minimal effort on the 
part of the administrator since the potential patentee simply registers the 
patent without a substantive examination. 
The direct contrast to the patent registry is an administrative 
system premised on substantive examination at the national level.  
Substantive examination, of course, is a complex undertaking.  Such 
systems require significant investment in personnel and in articulating 
standardized examination and review procedures.  The use of a patent 
registry, however, even if capable of resolving basic disputes,36 such as 
how to resolve competing claims between inventors, may be untenable.  
Article 27 of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs Agreement) requires signatory countries to 
carry out a substantive inquiry into novelty and inventive step.37 
A number of systems have developed a median approach in which 
the administrator relies on another agency—a national agency and/or a 
regional organization—to conduct the relevant search and examination 
of the patent.  The hybrid examination approach is possible given both 
the structure of the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT)38 and regional 
treaties such as the Andean Pact.39  These treaties allow a patentee to 
designate a state or regional entity responsible for the examination.  The 
hybrid examination approach is particularly useful for developing 
countries as it allows them to comply with the TRIPS Agreement in the 
 36 Robert C. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights 
For Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 594-95 (1999) 
(noting that the patent registry system did not work, despite low entry barrier, because of high 
cost associated with determining disputes between potential patent litigants). 
 37 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 27, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL 
INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND VOL. 31 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 81, 1997 (1994) 
[hereinafter TRIPs]. 
 38 PATENT COOPERATION TREATY, JUNE 19, 1970, 28. U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231, 
amended on Sept. 28, 1979, modified on FEB. 3, 1984 AND OCT. 3, 2001, http://www.wipo.int/ 
export/sites/www/pct/en/texts/pdf/pct.pdf (international patent treaty administered by WIPO 
covering one hundred and forty-two contracting states and providing a unified procedure for 
filing patent applications). 
 39 Andean Subregional Integration Agreement, May 26, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 910, as amended by 
Trujillo Protocol, Mar. 10, 1996.  See Common Provisions on Industrial Property, Decision No. 
486 of Sept. 14, 2002 of the Commission of the Andean Community, http://www.comunidad 
andina.org/ingles/normativa/D486e.htm) (discussing the bifurcated examination system of the 
Andean Pact). 
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face of considerable difficulties on the ground. 
c. Primary Actors: The Reviewers 
Two types of actors can review the consequences of a grant in an 
issued patent.  Internal administrative actors can review the validity of 
an issued patent using designated administrative procedures.  External 
judicial actors can undertake review of the validity and infringement of 
an issued patent.  It is possible for the roles of these primary reviewers 
to overlap, but often these reviewers follow different procedures and 
have different responsibilities within the context of a given patent 
regime.  Evidence exists that indicates that the availability of 
administrative and judicial review procedures in a patent system 
provides the maximum flexibility for parties seeking to challenge the 
issuance of a patent.40 
Internal administrative review is quite varied.  The two most 
common post-issuance procedures are re-examination and opposition.  
A re-examination typically involves a request to review the content of a 
patent in light of previously undisclosed information.  The process of 
re-examination often has significant disadvantages including: (1) limits 
on what type of patent can be significantly re-examined;41 (2) limits on 
the type of the appeal that can be undertaken in a dispute42; and (3) 
limits on the type of information that can be submitted.43  By contrast, 
opposition proceedings generally offer the opportunity to challenge an 
issued patent on broader substantive and procedural grounds.  For 
 40 Jay P. Kesan, Office Oppositions and Patent Invalidation in Court: Complements or 
Substitutes?, in PATENT LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 269 
(Toshiko Takenada, ed., 2008) (examining the use of complementary initial trial and examination 
systems by Japan and concluding that institutional reasons exist for maintaining two systems).  
See Patentgesetz [Austrian Patent Act] Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBl] No. 259/1970, §§ 47 ¶ 1, 102 
(Austria) (providing both re-examination and opposition as post-issuance procedures); see also 
Patentgesetz [Patent Act], Dec. 16, 1980, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, TEIL I [BGBl. I], §§ 81(4), 
27(3) (F.R.G.) (as amended by Laws of July 16 and August 6, 1998). 
 41 See, e.g., Patentgesetz [Patent Act] of 1970 § 91 ¶ 3 (Austria) (providing that re-
examination allows the owner of the patent to make certain amendments to its original claim); 
Poland Industrial Property Law of 30 June 2000, art. 37(1), as amended, June 29, 2007, 
http://www.jpo.go.jp/shiryou_e/s_sonota_e/fips_e/pdf/poland_e/e_sangyou.pdf (providing that 
re-examination process allows a patentee to make restricted additions and corrections to its 
application). 
 42 See, e.g., Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 306 (1952) (providing that only a patentee may 
appeal a disputed re-examination request). 
 43 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 101 (Austl.), http://www.jpo.go.jp/shiryou_e/s_sonota_e/fips_e/ 
pdf/australia_e/e_tokkyo.pdf (providing that the Australian Patent Act allows a patentee and any 
other person to undertake a re-examination request on substantive patent grounds, but limits the 
right to appeal a re-examination request to the patentee). 
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instance, Article 100 of the European Patent Convention (EPC) allows 
opposition based, among other things, on allegations that the invention 
is not patent eligible, not new, does not involve an inventive step or is 
insusceptible of industrial application or that the invention has been 
insufficiently disclosed.44  A broad number of parties can start 
opposition proceedings, and appeal in case of a disputed outcome.45 
 External judicial actors can undertake initial review of factual 
and legal issues that impact an issued patent, as well as appellate review 
of that initial review.  The design of these basic roles, though, is subject 
to considerable variety.  Such variety arises from two diverse sources.  
The first source of such jurisdictional variety is the difficulty of review 
associated with an issued patent.  Reviewing an issued patent is not an 
easy judicial undertaking.  The reviewer has to undertake several 
difficult legal inquiries associated with the validity and potential 
infringement of a patent.  In addition, the technical nature of the 
underlying technology can complicate patent review. 
Often, then, the question is whether patent law should be subject to 
a specialized external review that takes into consideration the difficulty 
of these inquiries.  Patent systems have answered this question in 
different ways, including: (1) creating a specialized trial court to address 
patent-related questions;46 (2) creating a specialized appellate court that 
reviews generalized initial review;47 (3) allowing a full-fledged judicial 
proceeding within the administrative agency and then allowing for 
subsequent review by general appellate proceeding;48 and (4) providing 
for a specialized trial and appellate review.49  Thus, while the challenge 
 44 See, e.g., Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 100, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 
U.N.T.S. 255 [hereinafter European Patent Convention], available at http://www.epo.org/law-
practice/legal-texts/html/epc/1973/e/ma1.html (follow links to different Convention articles) 
(outlining grounds for an opposition proceeding). 
 45 Id. art. 99(1) (outlining the type of party that may bring an opposition proceeding under the 
EPC); id. art. 107 (outlining the broad right of appeal to the opposition proceeding). 
 46 See, e.g., The Patents Act, 1977, c. 37, § 97(l) (Eng.), http://www.jpo.go.jp/shiryou_e/ 
s_sonata_e/fps_e/pdf/england_e/e_tokkyo.pdf (providing that petitioners may directly appeal 
decisions of the Intellectual Property Office to the Patent Court, a specialized trial court, and 
subsequently appeal those decisions to the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords). 
 47 See, e.g., Patentgesetz [Patent Act] of 1970 § 65(1)-(2) (Austria) (providing that an 
independent federal appellate court, the Federal Patent Court, be established for the purpose of 
hearing appeals from decisions of the examining sections or patent divisions of the patent 
offices). 
 48 See, e.g., Patentgesetz [Patent Act] of 1970 §§ 57 ¶ 1, 70 ¶¶ 1-3 (Austria) (providing that 
final decisions of the technical and legal department may be appealed to the appellate division of 
the Patent Office and then to the Supreme Patent and Trademark Board, and that final decisions 
of the nullity department may be appealed to the Supreme Patent and Trademark Board as the 
highest level of authority). 
 49 For instance, in Japan, the Tokyo and Osaka District Courts enjoy jurisdictional authority 
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presented by specialization is common to all patent systems, significant 
experimentation exists over how to solve this challenge.  For instance, 
the experience of the United States, which since 1982 has had 
centralized appellate review, has prompted significant debate over 
whether a specialized court creates the risk of excessive insularity and 
inadequately nuanced jurisprudence.50  At the same time, Europe has 
for decades been contemplating the creation of a centralized litigation 
system.51  A major impetus for imposing centralized litigation in Europe 
is the complexity of patent law in the post-grant phase, as well as the 
possibility that national courts may, for instance, issue different 
opinions regarding the validity of the same patent.52 
External review of patents also can vary because of a second 
over design and utility patent infringement.  The Intellectual Property High Court enjoys 
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent infringement appeals.  See David Hill & Shinichi 
Murada, Patent Litigation in Japan, 1 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 1, 151 (2007) (outlining the 
division of judicial authority over patent related materials). 
 50 See Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 
NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1646–49 (2007) (contending that the limited jurisprudence of the Federal 
Circuit arises because of its “institutional position, failure to adapt its common law to changing 
circumstances, reticence to consider empirical and economic literature and expansive judicial 
authority”); compare Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing Experiment 
in Specialization, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769, 770 (2004) (“Practitioners appear to be in 
general agreement that centralizing patent appeals in a single court is a vast improvement over 
regional adjudication.” (citing Carl Tobias, The White Commission and the Federal Circuit, 10 
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 45, 58 (2000))). 
 51 Draft Agreement on the European and Community Patents Court and Draft Statute, 
(Working Document 7928/09 PI 23 COUR 29, 2009), http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en 
/09/st07/st07928.en09.pdf. 
 52 For example, the European Central Bank has challenged the Document Security System’s 
[DSS] patent in numerous jurisdictions.  To date, the validity of the DSS’s patent has been upheld 
in the Netherlands and Spain.  See Rb. Gravenhage 12 Maart 2008, 269923/HA ZA 06-2495 (De 
Europese Centrale Bank/Document Security Systems, Inc.) [European Central Bank v. Document 
Security Systems] (Neth.), available at http://www.boek9.nl/index.php?//The+European+Central 
+Bank+vs.+Document+Security+Systems%2C+Inc.////22333/; Mary Stone, Court Rules 
Document Security Systems Patent Valid in Spain, ROCHESTER BUS. J., Mar. 24, 2010, 
http://rbj.flex360hosting.com/article.asp?aID=183392. The patent has been invalidated in 
Germany, the United Kingdom, Austria, Belgium, and France.  See Mary Stone, Document 
Security Systems Loses in German Court, ROCHESTER BUS. J., July 9, 2010, http://www.rbj.net/ 
article.asp?aID=184435; Press Release, Document Security Systems Announces Ruling in Patent 
Validity Lawsuit in United Kingdom (Mar. 26, 2007), available at http://documentsecurity.com/ 
press_releases.php?id=72; Document Securities Systems, Inc. Announces Ruling in Patent 
Validity Hearing by Austrian Patent Office, REUTERS, Nov. 20, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/ 
finance/stocks/keyDevelopments?rpc=66&symbol=DMC&timestamp=20100804150600; 
Document Security Systems Announces Ruling in Patent Validity Lawsuit in Belgium Court, PR 
NEWSWIRE, Nov. 3, 2009, http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/document-security-systems 
-announces-ruling-in-patent-validity-lawsuit-by-belgiumcourt-68964912.html; Cour’ d’appel 
[CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, ch. 1, Mar. 17, 2010, No. 08/09140 (Fr.), http://www. 
eplawpatentblog.com/2010/March/SCN_20100317152247_001%5B1%5D.pdf. 
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source of institutional multiplicity—the relationship of the external 
judicial actor with the broader system of judicial authority.  For 
instance, Australia and Canada allow both federal and state courts to 
undertake an initial review of patents.  By contrast, the United States 
only allows federal courts to review patent cases.53 
The European “constitutional”54 system has proven to be a 
particularly resonant example of how the structure of the patent regime 
can impact policy-making.  Specifically, the interplay between regional 
and national institutions results in a complex regulatory environment in 
which to review the consequences of a given patent.  The EPO, which is 
an inter-governmental body independent of the institutional framework 
of the European Union, can review an issued patent through an 
opposition proceeding.55  Within the European “constitutional” system, 
once the EPO has issued a patent, the European patent becomes a 
“bundle” of national patents, which are subject to judicial decisions on 
validity and infringement in all the different Member States.56  The 
European Courts in Luxemburg do not have any powers regarding 
patents granted by the EPO.57  As a result, no system currently exists for 
issuing a European Union wide determination on the validity and 
infringement of a given patent. 
The difficulties of this structure are amplified by the basic 
differences in the legal culture between common-law and continental 
law systems at the national level.  Judicial actors within a common law 
system may more readily accept their roles as active policymakers58 in 
setting patent policies than judges in continental law systems.  The 
Court of Justice of the European Union has repeatedly been criticized 
for its activist role in other matters beyond patent law.59  Thus, 
 53 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a)(2006) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil 
action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights 
and trademark.”). 
 54 The European Union nor the European Patent Office have an underlying “constitutional” 
structure as they cannot be regarded as states.  We continue, however, to use the term, first, for 
reasons of comparison, and second, to stress that the historical, underlying institutional structures 
are the main cause for complexity at the European level. 
 55 European Patent Convention, supra note 44, art. 99. 
 56 Id. art. 64. 
 57 See, e.g., G2/06 WARF/Stem Cells, [2009] E.P.O.R. 15 (EPO Enlarged Bd. App.) 
 58 Judicial reviewers (e.g. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) in the United States are 
often reluctant to acknowledge their role as policymakers, insisting rather that they decide 
disputes between parties, despite the often-clear consequences of their decisions.  See Colleen 
Chien, Patent Amicus Briefs: What the Courts’ Friends Can Teach Us About the Patent System, 1 
U.C. I. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2010). 
 59 See, e.g., PATRICK NEIL, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE. A CASE STUDY IN JUDICIAL 
ACTIVISM (1995); Trevor Hartley, The European Court, Judicial Objectivity and the Constitution 
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foundational conceptions of the appropriate exercise of judicial 
discretion may also play a key role in how external review of patent law 
takes place. 
2.  The Formal Dimension: Secondary Actors 
Primary actors, obviously, have a strong role to play within patent 
law.  Patent doctrine, though, has become more diverse over time.  It 
has incorporated new subject matter, such as topics related to public 
health, antitrust, unfair competition and trade.  These changes have had 
the consequence of strengthening the role of what we term secondary 
actors60 within the domestic and regional patent systems.  These 
secondary administrative actors may have significant authority to 
articulate policy over issued patents that are outside of the orbit of the 
primary actors.  The roles of these actors can be placed into two 
categories, replicative and expertise actors. 
Initially, a replicative actor serves to supplement the role of a 
primary internal or adjudicative actor.  These actors may serve to 
replicate the policy determinations of the primary actors.  These 
replicators may have a significant impact on the development of 
doctrinal development.  For example, the Plant Variety Protection 
Office within the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) reviews and 
grants Certificates of Plant Variety Protection (CPVP), extending 
breeders up to twenty-five years of exclusive control over new sexually 
reproduced or tuber plant varieties meeting certain criteria.61  The 
CPVP function of the USDA mirrors and supplements the patent-
granting powers of the USPTO, but these powers apply exclusively to 
asexually produced plants and provide mutually exclusive remedies.62  
Although CPVPs do not duplicate plant patents, jurisprudence produced 
by CPVP litigation inevitably adds to the body of plant patent doctrine, 
albeit indirectly, through policy determinations.  Thus, any discussion 
of patent policy-making necessarily includes an understanding of these 
additional actors since they can have a significant effect on the doctrinal 
development of patent law. 
A secondary actor can also assume authority over patent policy 
of the European Union, 112 L. Q. REV. 95 (1996); Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz, Judicial Activism of 
the European Court of Justice and the Development of the European Social Mode in Anti-
Discrimination and Consumer Law (EUI LAW, Working Paper No. 2009/19, 2009). 
 60 A typology of secondary actors (replicative and expertise actors) and several examples of 
secondary actors (e.g., U.S. Department of Agriculture and US Federal Trade Commission) is 
provided below.  These actors are further defined in the Chart in Part II.A. 
 61 Plant Variety Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2582 (2006). 
 62 Plant Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2006). 
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because of a designated expertise in an unrelated subject matter.  Two 
kinds of expertise actors are common within a patent regime.  
Competition regulators may examine the impact of the behavior of a 
patentee on competition law.63  Drug administrators may review a 
previously patented drug.64  While these types of expertise actors may 
supplement the policy determinations of the primary actor, these actors 
can become potential rivals to the policy actor in defining the limits of 
an issued patent or the behavior of the patentee.  For example, if the 
competition authority would limit the ability of patent owners to 
restrictively license a patent, such a limitation could weaken the power 
of a patentee to decide on the exploitation of the patent. 
3. The Heterogeneous Actors in Network Governance 
The activity of heterogeneous institutional “actors” creates an 
increasingly decentralized regulatory environment in which to address 
issues associated with the grant of a patent.  Despite the increasingly 
 63 John DeQ Briggs, Intellectual Property and Antitrust: Two Scorpions in a Bottle, 10 
SEDONA CONF. J. 65, 66 (2009) (examining the role of the Federal Trade Commission and its 
suggestion that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office consider the possible harm to competition 
before extending the scope of patentable subject matter); JONATHAN D.C. TURNER, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND EU COMPETITION LAW (2010) (examining the regulatory 
framework for the exploitation and licensing of intellectual property rights, including patents). 
 64 The role of the Food and Drug Administration is well understood within the context of the 
patent law of the United States.  See Adam Mossoff, Exclusion and Exclusive Use in Patent Law, 
22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 335 (2009) (quoting Professors Robert Merges, Peter Mennell and 
Mark Lemley, in regard to administrative review in the United States, “[a] patent does not 
automatically grant an affirmative right to do anything; patented pharmaceuticals, for instance, 
must still pass regulatory review at the Food and Drug Administration to be sold legally.”).  Drug 
regulators’ roles in other countries are equally interesting.  For example in Canada, while the 
provincial governments exercise the primary control over the license of patented pharmaceuticals, 
the federal government of Canada can supplement these policies by determining whether a drug 
can be sold or has been sold at an excessive price.  See Melanie Bourassa Forcier & Jean-Frederic 
Morin, Canadian Pharmaceutical Policy: International Constraints and Domestic Priorities, in 
AN EMERGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PARADIGM: PERSPECTIVE FROM CANADA 81, 87-89 
(Ysolde Gondreau, ed., 2008).  By contrast, in Europe, legislation does not allow “patent 
linkage,” which operates by linking market approval for generic medicines, as well as their 
pricing and reimbursement status, to the patent status of the original reference product.  European 
Commission Final Report for the Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry at 130, (July 8, 2009) 
[hereinafter Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry], http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuti 
cals/inquiry/staff_working_paper_part1.pdf (explaining that “ . . . the authorisation to market a 
medicinal product is taken on the basis of scientific criteria concerning the quality, safety, and 
efficacy of the medicinal product concerned: these criteria are related to public health 
considerations, and no other criteria should be taken into account.  All other issues relating to 
private law, such as for example, the patent status of the medicinal product, are to be dealt with 
on the basis of patent laws before the competent courts . . . .”). This has the consequence of 
disaggregating market approval of generics from broader patent issues. 
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decentralized nature of network governance, the role of formal 
institutional actors may actually be strengthened since they can serve as 
centralized points in this decentralized policy environment. 
Scott Burris, Peter Drahos and Clifford Shearing have termed these 
centralized points as “nodes” within the networks.65  These “nodes” are 
entities with a set of technologies, mentalities and resources that 
mobilize the knowledge and capacity of members to manage the course 
of events.66  While nodes may take a wide variety of forms, from 
legislators and government agencies through NGOs to firms or even 
gangs, formal patent actors—whether primary or secondary—can serve 
as crucial nodes in network governance.67  By serving as “nodes,” 
formal patent actors can formalize the roles of different stakeholders 
within a given community by offering a forum and associated 
procedures where stakeholder concerns can be heard, such as re-
examination and opposition procedures. 
Moreover, formal patent actors can themselves collaborate on 
patent policy and procedure, thus intensifying their organizational 
power within the network.  This way, they create “super-structural 
nodes.”68  Super-structural nodes are the sites that bring together 
different nodal organizations so as to concentrate resources and 
technologies of the individual nodes for a common purpose.69  Super-
structural nodes have emerged consistently within the patent regime, 
and can be either short-term or long-term in nature.  For instance, the 
USPTO, the Japanese Patent Office (JPO), and the EPO have 
collaborated to create a “super-structural” node by way of “Trilateral 
Co-operation.”70  This trilateral co-operation has a number of 
objectives, such as improving the quality of examination processes, 
reducing the processing time of patent applications, improving the 
quality of incoming applications, developing common infrastructure for 
 65 See generally Burris et al., Nodal Governance, supra note 27; Peter Drahos, Intellectual 
Property and Pharmaceutical Markets: A Nodal Governance Approach, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 401, 
401-24 (2004); Scott Burris, Governance, Microgovernance and Health, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 335, 
335-58 (2004); Peter Drahos et al., Group Discussion at RegNet Conference: The Nodal and the 
Global (Dec. 10, 2003). 
 66 See generally Burris et al., Nodal Governance, supra note 27.  For instance, a patent 
examining agency has specific procedures (examination and rulemakings) and tools (e.g., budget 
and/or databases) to carry out its specific tasks.  Applicants and other stakeholders can use these 
procedures to influence the decision-making process.  Thus, patent examining agencies can serve 
as a formalized “node” within the context of network governance. 
 67 Burris et al., Nodal Governance, supra note 27, at 38. 
 68 Id. at 31-38. 
 69 Id. at 31-38. 
 70 TRILATERAL, http://www.trilateral.net (last visited Sept. 3, 2010). 
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electronic systems and search tools, and solving common problems 
related to the protection of industrial property rights by harmonizing the 
practices of the three Offices.71 
B. Dynamic Patent Governance: Its Informal Dimension 
The informal dimension of dynamic patent governance is 
increasingly contributes to the dynamic nature of patent governance.  
Recent patent governance has seen the emergence of a wide continuum 
of stakeholders entering the patent system, whose aims and objectives 
are potentially in conflict with each other. 
Modern patent law has typically relied on well-organized and well-
informed epistemic communities, which have played an out-sized role 
in patent law decision-making.  Epistemic communities, as identified by 
Susana Borrás, share a set of: 
[W]orldviews, common understandings, norms, routines and daily 
practices that define the interactions among public and private 
organizations and individual actors in the patent system.  [Patent] 
Governance [then] takes place within networks of stakeholders, 
patent professionals and practitioners, who form powerful 
[epistemic] communities—sometimes competing against each 
other—and whose interactions decisively influences the shape of the 
patent system.72 
These epistemic communities have formed increasingly powerful 
networks that work to influence patent policy-making across multiple 
institutional forums. 
Recently, however, patent law has also been impacted by what we 
term a more loosely defined, “patent civil society.”  This civil society is 
often composed of constituted groups of consumers, patients, 
physicians, scientists, interested citizens, and other non-patent experts, 
that seek to participate in patent policy-making.  This patent civil 
society has played a disruptive role, in recent patent policy-making, 
often criticizing the basic norms of the well-settled epistemic 
communities.  This Part considers both the epistemic communities and 
patent civil society in turn. 
1.  The Informal Dimension: Epistemic Communities 
Patent law is widely regarded as a very complex field of law 
because of its difficult legal framework, procedures and concepts, as 
 71 Id.  See infra Part V.B. 
 72 Borrás, supra note 23, at 598. 
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well as the inherently technical nature of patents.  The complex nature 
of patent law has led to decision-making by highly qualified technical 
and legal experts.73  The dominant core of these epistemic communities 
consists of transnational firms with important patent portfolios, 
technically sophisticated lawyers, legal academics, and legally trained 
scientific experts and officials.  Such actors have a strong impact on the 
patent system as well as patent policy on the national, regional and 
international levels.  Over the past decades, patent governance has 
become the almost exclusive province of an epistemic community of 
patent experts.74 
Epistemic communities continue to shape patent law reform, 
policies, and doctrine.  First, epistemic communities have been closely 
involved in shaping the various proposals for patent law reform 
discussed on both sides of the Atlantic.  Epistemic industrial and 
professional organizations75 actively engage with legislators throughout 
the patent reform process since most politicians do not have any 
expertise with respect to patents. 
Second, the inauguration of new policies concerning patent 
procedure and issuance is often preceded by internal and/or external 
consultations.  Epistemic participants continue to shape policies which 
are favorable to them in these internal or external consultations.  The 
types of consultations may vary due to various administrative cultures.  
Consultations can range from relatively informal discussion forums, 
where all interest groups have an opportunity to be represented, to more 
formalized procedures, in which ad hoc panels or institutionalized 
bodies consider policies with accompanying formalized procedures.  An 
example of an informal consultation are the public hearings conducted 
in 2006 by the European Commission on “Future Patent Policy in 
Europe,” whereas an example of a more formalized procedure is the 
notice and comment rule-making conducted by the USPTO under the 
 73 William Gormley has proposed a framework that seeks to explain levels of public interest 
in certain subjects.  See generally William Gormley, Regulatory Issue Networks in a Federal 
System, 18 POLITY 595 (1986).  He classifies patent law as an area characterized by high 
complexity (significant technical specialization) but low salience (relevance to the public).  Id. at 
598.  The emergence of a broader patent civil society suggests that the salience of patent law has 
been improving in a significant sense. 
 74 PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE 
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? (2003). 
 75 Examples of such professional organizations are the International Association for the 
Protection of Intellectual Property (AIPPI), the International Association for the Advancement of 
Teaching and Research in Intellectual Property (ATRIP), and the American Intellectual Property 
Association (AIPLA). 
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Administrative Procedure Act.76  While in principle the latter process 
would seem likely to prompt significant epistemic participation, broader 
discussion forums offer a platform to both epistemic communities and 
civil society to provide their insights.  Experience shows, however, that 
in practice these broader forums are often reduced to an active 
discussion between leaders from epistemic communities, with most civil 
society participants not having an opportunity to actively participate in 
the discussion. 
Third, in many countries, expert judges play an important role in 
the development of patent case law.  Review by primary judicial actors 
is often a specialized form of external review.  This specialization can 
be realized in different ways.  The views of expert judges with a 
specialization in patents are generally highly regarded—though not free 
from criticism by patent scholars and patent practitioners.  In fact, they 
are often invited as key speakers at patent conferences and 
parliamentary hearings to explain recent caselaw, to comment on 
potential gaps in the patent governance system, and to discuss the need 
for patent reform.  At these meetings they engage with members of the 
epistemic communities and exchange opinions and experiences.  Such 
informal discussion platforms have not been accessible to the broader 
civil society. 
The involvement of epistemic communities has proven to be a 
mixed blessing.  On the one hand, such experts safeguard a level of 
expertise required by the complex nature of patent law, thus helping to 
guarantee high quality and efficient decision-making in the patent 
policy arena.  On the other hand, fears of “insider governance” and 
“collective action” exist due to the continued involvement of a small 
group of experts and stakeholders. 
2. The Informal Dimension: The Patent Civil Society 
A loosely organized patent civil society stands in contrast to the 
more well-defined and powerful epistemic communities.  This patent 
civil society consists of what John Clark has termed “policy-influencing 
civil society organizations,” such as development and human rights 
NGOs, environmental and other pressure groups, trade unions, 
consumer organizations, faith-based and inter-faith groups, and certain 
professor organizations.77  Examples of these organizations within the 
 76 Commission Public Hearing on a Future Patent Policy in Europe, COM (2006) 170 (Jul. 
12, 2006), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/docs/patent/hearing/report_en.pdf. 
 77 JOHN CLARK, GLOBALIZING CIVIC ENGAGEMENT: CIVIL SOCIETY AND TRANSNATIONAL 
ACTION 1 (2003). 
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context of patent law include the Public Patent Foundation,78 
Greenpeace,79 Doctors without Borders,80 Amnesty International,81 
various farmer’s associations,82 medical associations,83 patient 
groups,84 and centers for genetic research and 
The emergence of patent civil organizations has had significant 
consequences for patent law.  These organizations typically adopt a 
critical stance towards the overall goals of a given patent regime.  For 
instance, the mission statement of the Public Patent Foundation 
(PUBPAT) states: 
Specifically, PUBPAT works to strengthen the patent system by 
introducing a healthy amount of non-patentee input to help the 
system achieve high quality and balanced policies.  At its core, our 
work is based on the fundamental concept of protecting freedom 
from illegitimate restraint.  Since patents are, by nature, 
government-granted restraints on freedom, every Tuesday (the day 
of the week the Patent Office issues new patents) there are roughly 
3,500 new things that no American is allowed to do, and there is no 
fair use defense to patent infringement like with copyright and 
trademark.  Thus, although we do believe that a properly functioning 
patent system can help a vibrant innovative economy, great care 
must nonetheless be taken to avoid the negative effects that over-
patenting, unmerited patenting and excessive patent rights can have 
on society. 
 78 PUB. PATENT FOUNDATION, http://www.pubpat.org (last visited Aug. 25, 2010). 
 79 Patents on Life, GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL, http://www.greenpeace.org/international 
/en/campaigns/agriculture/problem/genetic-engineering/ge-agriculture-and-genetic-pol/patents-
on-life/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2010). 
 80 Access to Medicines, DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS, http://www.doctorswithoutborders. 
org/news/allcontent.cfm?id=84 (last visited Aug. 25, 2010). 
 81 Amnesty International, Amnesty International urges WTO members to respect human 
rights obligations in trade negotiations in Hong Kong, AI Index: IOR 30/016/2005 (Dec. 9, 2005), 
available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?id=ENGIOR300162005& 
lang=e. 
 82 Keep Out Patents on Conventional Seeds and Animals, NO PATENTS ON SEEDS, 
http://www.no-patents-on-seeds.org/images/documents/the_global_appeal.pdf (listing the 
farmer’s associations signing an open letter to the Enlarged Board of Appeal of the European 
Patent Office, Government Representatives, [and] the Executive Boards of Agrobusiness 
Companies). 
 83 Larry Storer, World Medical Associations, AMA Oppose Medical Method Patents, VEIN 
THERAPY NEWS, http://veintherapynews.com/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id= 
109 (last visited February 7, 2011). 
 84 Pathologists and Patient Groups Challenge BRCA1 & BRCA2 Gene Patents in Court, 
DARK DAILY, (Feb. 12, 2010), http://www.darkdaily.com/pathologists-and-patient-groups-challe 
nge-brca1-brca2-gene-patents-in-court-212. 
 85 About Patents, Other Intellectual Property & Human Biotechnology, CENTER FOR 
GENETICS AND SOCIETY, http://www.geneticsandsociety.org/section.php?id=94 (last visited 
March 20, 2011). 
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The best way to do that is to ensure that all of the interests affected 
by the patent system, including the public interest in freedom from 
unjustified restraints, are adequately represented.86  
The Public Patent Foundation’s mission statement is reflective of 
“patent civil society” norms in its insistence on: (1) the importance of a 
“public interest” that should explicitly limit the reach of patent law; (2) 
the failure of current patent norms to adequately address these issues 
related to the public interest, such as, for example, broadening access to 
pharmaceutical drugs; and (3) the necessity of organized actors that 
seek to advance norms which can adequately address existing problems.  
Notably, while the Public Patent Foundation and other NGOs view 
themselves as public interest advocates, they still use standard epistemic 
strategies such as inter partes examination at the USPTO and 
opposition procedures at the EPO.87 
Despite the deployment of such epistemic strategies, we still claim, 
however, that the patent civil society differs from more established 
epistemic communities.  First, while organizations, such as the Public 
Patent Foundation and Greenpeace, deploy common epistemic 
strategies, the emergence of novel participants that build on expertise 
outside of patent law has expanded the boundaries of patent discourse.  
For example, in 2009, Doctors Without Borders, whose work has 
largely been in the area of international medical assistance, initiated a 
campaign to pressure the nine major pharmaceutical companies to 
create patent pools for new treatments in HIV/AIDs.88  Doctors Without 
Borders is representative of a “new” patent-policy participant, whose 
participation draws on “expert” knowledge that is not related to the 
traditional epistemic community.  In doing so, Doctors Without Borders 
can be seen as playing a role similar to the “expertise” actors in the 
formal dimension.  The “expert” role of Doctors Without Borders is 
complemented by its use of aggressive advocacy strategies not typically 
deployed by the traditional epistemic community.  For instance, Doctors 
Without Borders combined its advocacy on behalf of “patent pooling” 
with an extensive letter-writing campaign to the nine major 
 86 About PUBPAT, PUB. PATENT FOUND, http://www.pubpat.org/About.htm (last visited 
Sept. 2, 2010). 
 87 PUBPAT Activities, PUB. PATENT FOUND, http://www.pubpat.org/activities.htm (last 
visited Sept. 2, 2010) (“PUBPAT’s primary tool for protecting the public domain is filing 
requests for re-examination with the PTO.”). 
 88 Press Release, Doctors Without Borders, Drug Companies Called on to Pool HIV Patents 
(September 30, 2009), available at http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/press/release.cfm?id= 
3970&cat=press-release. 
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pharmaceutical companies.89 
Second, the concerns of patent civil society groups are not always 
easily translated in “common patent vocabulary” that includes such 
statutory requirements as patent eligible subject matter, obviousness, 
and inventive step.  Therefore, many of the existent formal procedures 
may prove resistant to incorporating those concerns.  Mechanisms may 
exist, however, that advance participation in patent-decision-making.  
For example, in opposition proceedings to challenge the validity of a 
given patent, members of patent civil society frequently invoke Article 
53(a) of the European Patent Convention, which states that no patents 
will be granted for inventions the commercial exploitation of which be 
contrary to the “ordre public or morality.”90  Article 53(a)’s explicit 
commitment to “public” values allows these members of the patent civil 
society to invoke inter-disciplinary public concerns in their advocacy. 
Finally, addressing “public interest” concerns in patent law has 
been profoundly disruptive to the settled expectations of institutional 
actors and the epistemic community insofar as “public interest” 
concerns often question the underlying norms of the modern patent 
regime.  These norms have tended to stress the importance of ownership 
rights as necessary to ensure the “public interest,” in promotion of 
research and development, and innovation. 
III.  DYNAMIC PATENT GOVERNANCE: ITS CONSEQUENCES 
What are the consequences of instituting a system that incorporates 
dynamic patent governance?  We identify two major consequences.  
First, dynamic patent governance fosters a greater fluidity between the 
formal and informal dimensions of governance.  Second, dynamic 
patent governance has prompted an ongoing reappraisal of broader 
public mechanisms within the legislative, executive and judicial nodes.  
We consider each in turn. 
A. Consequence One: Fluidity Between The Formal and Informal 
Dimensions 
A key consequence of dynamic patent governance is a more fluid 
interaction between the formal and informal dimensions of the patent 
 89 Make it Happen Campaign Update, DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS (Oct. 7, 2009), 
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.com/news/article.cfm?id=3993&cat=field-news. 
 90 See, e.g., G2/06 WARF/Stem Cells, [2009] E.P.O.R. 15 (EPO Enlarged Bd. App.); T-
0315/03 In re The President and Fellows of Harvard College/Method for Producing Transgenic 
Animals (6 Jul. 2004) (EPO Bd. App.). 
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governance system.  We stress that dynamic patent governance differs 
from other theories in that it stresses that patent governance includes 
two trends—heterogeneity in the formal dimension, and a maturing 
patent public in the informal dimension.  These two trends feed each 
other continually as various stakeholders compete at different sites 
within the network to achieve their policy outcomes.  In particular, the 
existence of multiple primary and secondary actors can serve as a 
platform where different stakeholders can try to impact policy-making 
and reform. 
This fluid policy environment has two noteworthy consequences.  
First, a more diverse regulatory environment can be more responsive in 
assessing newly identified problems within the patent context.  For 
instance, the Department of Agriculture and the DOJ recently held their 
first workshop on competition policy in the agricultural sector.  This 
workshop included an analysis of patent law in the seed patent context, 
91 an issue provoked by a growing “food politics” around the origins of 
food production in a modern economy.92  In the area of climate change, 
the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP), the EPO and the 
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) 
are jointly collaborating on the development of a study that aims to 
enhance understanding of the role of patents in generating access to 
environmentally sound technologies. 93 This study hopes to provide 
useful input into ongoing discussions on technology transfer in the 
context of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC).94 
Second, a more fluid policy environment offers interested parties 
(whether in the epistemic or patent civil society) a wider range of 
diverse administrative levers.  An important example of such an 
expansion of participation in the patent system is the use of citizen 
petitions under Section 505(Q) of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic 
Act,95 which in its implementing regulations96 provides that any person 
 91 Press Release, Department of Justice, DOJ and USDA Hold First-Ever Workshop on 
Competition Issues in Agriculture (March 12, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/publi 
c/press_releases/2010/256496.htm. 
 92 Michael Pollan, The Food Movement, Rising, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, (June 10, 2010) (book 
review), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/jun/10/food-movement-rising/?paginati 
on=false. 
 93 Press Release, European Patent Office, EPO, UNEP and ICTSD to work on green patent 
study (Apr. 27, 2009), available at http://www.epo.org/news-issues/news/2009/20090427.html. 
 94 Id. 
 95 21 U.S.C. § 355(q) (2010) (allowing for the submission of citizen petitions within the 
context of the submission of generic pharmaceutical drugs). 
 96 21 C.F.R. § 10.30 (2011) (outlining guidelines for submission of citizen petitions within 
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can submit a good-faith petition97 in response to the submission of a 
generic drug application.  The ability to participate in agency decision-
making at all stages is notably limited within the context of 
administrative patent decision-making, although recent experiments, 
such as the peer-to-patent system, and the ability for third parties to file 
observations or statements at the EPO,98 may provide interesting 
avenues for public participation. 
B. Consequence Two: Reappraising the Public’s Role in Formal 
Dimensions 
The second consequence of dynamic patent governance is a 
reappraisal of the public’s role in decision-making.  In particular, as 
primary and secondary actors serve as “nodes” at the different decision-
making points, a key question at each node will be how to determine the 
best method for public participation.  Thus, dynamic patent governance 
has begun to prompt a reappraisal of how the public can participate in 
patent decision-making at each respective node. 
1. Consequences at the Legislative Node 
As we discuss, infra, the legislative “node” has emerged as a key 
forum in the current patent regime.  The legislative process in the patent 
context is subject to a number of key pressures (such as temporal and 
ideological uncertainty).  But its greatest danger is that legislators may 
yield to intense interest group pressure, with variable outcomes that 
often do not take broader “public interest” values into consideration.  
For instance, Jay Kesan and Andreas Gallo claim that patent reform 
efforts in the United States have been dominated by a group of what 
they term “inventors’ ‘pressure groups’,”99which include individual 
inventors, universities, big-sector-based corporations and small-sector-
based corporations.100  The dominance of the “inventive” community at 
the expense of other potential societal interests risks the use of the 
the context of generic pharmaceutical drug provisions). 
 97 Gerald F. Masoudi, Legal Developments in the Enforcement of Food and Drug Law, 63 
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 585, 588-89 (2008) (outlining the inclusion of citizen petition verification 
procedures under Section 505(q) of the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 
2007). 
 98 European Patent Convention, supra note 44, art. 115. 
 99 Jay Kesan & Andres Gallos, The Political Economy of the Patent System, 87 N.C. L. REV. 
1341, 1352–54 (2009). 
 100 Id. at 1353.  Kesan and Gallos divide the corporate inventor interest into four categories: 
(1) “Big IT;” (2) “Big Pharma and Biotech companies;” (3) “Small IT;” and (4) “Small Pharma 
and Biotech Companies.”  Id. 
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legislative process as a method to intensify certain inequities within the 
pre-existing patent regime.  In particular, it may strengthen the tendency 
of politicians to over-rely on epistemic communities at the expense of 
other viable civil society stakeholders.  Full reliance on a small group of 
patent law experts for patent policy-making and patent law 
harmonization has the potential to lead to serious democratic deficits in 
patent policymaking. 
The revival of the legislative actor, in a crucial role, then, raises 
one key question: are there effective methods for including a wide range 
of actors who represent a broad set of inventive interest groups, or 
further the goals of the traditional epistemic community?  Patent law 
reform in the United States has not offered any significant innovation in 
this respect.  Patent law reform has followed the usual template for 
legislative decision-making in the United States, with limited 
opportunities for testimony before legislative sub-committees, as well as 
closed negotiations between key legislators, such as Senators Patrick 
Leahy and Orrin Hatch.101 
Patent reform in Europe, however, has used a broader range of 
consultative processes to address a more varied set of public interests.  
Europe has used several methods to allow for the involvement of a 
critical layer of citizens.  First, the European Parliament (EP) has 
employed the traditional method of having a comprehensive study from 
independent experts102 preceded103 and followed104 by workshops in 
order to inform discussion in the EP.  There are two issues that deserve 
some more attention.  First, this study explicitly included a 
reconsideration of the governance of the European Patent System.105  
 101 William L. Warren, Patent Law Reform in the Works Again: Third Time Could be the 
Charm for Legislative Efforts that Benefit Investors and Job Growth, GENETIC ENGINEERING 
AND BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWS, May 1, 2010, http://www.genengnews.com/ 
gen-articles/patent-law-reform-in-the-works-again/3271. 
 102 ROBIN COWAN ET AL., EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, SCIENTIFIC TECHNOLOGY OPTIONS 
ASSESSMENT: POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN PATENT SYSTEM 
(Sept. 2007), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/stoa/publications/studies/stoa16_en.pdf. 
 103 Before the draft of the report, a workshop was organized on November 9, 2006, where 
several independent experts and stakeholders were invited to present policy options and debate 
them with members of the EP and the expert working group.  See STOA Workshop on Policy 
Options for the European Patent System, THE DANISH BOARD OF TECHNOLOGY (Nov. 22, 2006), 
http://www.tekno.dk/subpage.php3?article=1345&language=uk&category=11&toppic=kategori1
1.’s 
 104 After the final draft of the report, a second workshop was organized on June 14, 2007 to 
discuss the findings of the expert working group, where the working group presented the report 
and discussed it with members of the EP and the audience.  See STOA Workshop: Policy Options 
for the Improvement of the European Patent System, http://www.tekno.dk/pdf/projekter/patent-
system STOA/p07_STOA_Patent_Workshop_Programme.pdf. 
 105 At the first workshop, two well-known patent governance scholars were invited: Peter 
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Though the recommendations of the working group on governance 
issues were limited and focused primarily on transparency and 
information exchange on patent policy, the initiative to put patent 
governance on the agenda is nevertheless welcome.  Second, compared 
to the limited opportunities for testimony during hearings before the 
U.S. Congress—in theory—anyone interested in these workshops could 
have attended, and there were many opportunities for the general 
audience to be heard.  Unfortunately, in practice, the number of 
participants from the patent civil society and the number of members of 
the EP attending the workshops was relatively limited.  The second 
method employed by the European Union is that the European 
Commission, which has the ability to propose legislation in the form of 
directives or regulations, can initiate a consultation combined with a 
public hearing, where all interested civil society groups can be 
represented.  In January 2006, the European Commission began this 
process and launched a consultation on the patent system in Europe.106  
It received over 2500107 responses which were closely studied and 
summarized, and which were decisive during discussion of topics at the 
public hearing.  At the hearing, about forty pre-selected stakeholders 
were invited to give their views, and the members of the audience could 
also comment.108  Third, the EPO undertook a significant, strategic, 
forward thinking, planning process that consulted a wide range of 
academics and other patent administrators using different so-called 
“scenarios.”109  While the EPO does not pursue a legislative agenda, its 
Drahos and Ingrid Schneider.  Peter Drahos presented the theoretical model of network 
governance and its application in the patent system.  Peter Drahos, Dir., Ctr. for Governance of 
Knowledge and Dev. Regulatory Inst’s. Network, Austl. Nat’1 Univ., Governance of the 
European Patent System: A Separation of Powers Approach (Nov. 9, 2006), http://www.tekno.dk 
/pdf/projekter/patent-system-STOA/Drahos.pdf.  Though the working group did include a short 
analysis of network governance and the informal and informal dimension, in our opinion the 
recommendations drawn from the model were limited.  See ROBIN COWAN, ET AL., supra note 
102, at 34-36. 
 106 European Commission Questionnaire On the Patent System in Europe (Jan. 9, 2006), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/docs/patent/consult_en.pdf. 
 107 Commission Public Hearing on a Future Patent Policy in Europe, supra note 76. 
 108 Id. 
 109 EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE (2007), http://documents.epo 
.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/63A726D28B589B5BC12572DB00597683/$File/EPO_scenar
ios_bookmarked.pdf (June 2007).  Scenario development is widely used in policy planning when 
organizations wish to test strategies against uncertain future developments to understand different 
ways that future events might unfold. See generally  Paul Schoemaker, Multiple Scenario 
Development: Its Conceptual and Behavioral Foundation, 14 STRATEGIC MGMT J. 195-96 
(1994). The scenarios were presented to constitute plausible, relevant and challenging stories 
about possible future developments with respect to the global patent system.  EUROPEAN PATENT 
OFFICE, SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 109, at 1.  The issues examined by the 
MURRAY-ZIMMEREN_TO_IZRAILEV_19.2 4/18/2011  4:49:00 PM 
318 CARDOZO J. OF INT’L & COMP. LAW [Vol. 19:287 
 
use of “scenarios” may also be an interesting approach for legislators 
that consider reforms. 
Thus, the efforts in Europe offer interesting lessons on a broader 
set of methods that could be used to conduct patent reform within the 
legislative node.110  First, the heterogeneity of the institutions involved 
in writing patent regulations and creating policy; such as the EPO, the 
European Commission, the EP, and the Council of the European Union, 
has valuably led to the development of a more experimental culture 
which is better suited to use public participation mechanisms in 
attempts to reform the patent system.  Second, due to the broader range 
of public interests involved in the reform process in Europe, reform 
efforts in Europe can be seen as more “forward-looking” and less 
reactionary than similar attempts in the United States.  Nevertheless, the 
legitimacy of the European initiatives is also open to criticism.  In a 
narrow sense, some of the consultative projects, like the EPO’s 
Scenarios Project, still primarily rely on the traditional epistemic 
community, and accordingly provide for weak interaction with a wider 
spectrum of stakeholders.  In a broader sense, the European Union’s 
legislative experimentation with the involvement of more stakeholders 
may create a significant risk that patent policymaking is subject to 
decision paralysis in light of greater democratic participation.  The 
consultation procedure that delivered over 2500 responses illustrates 
this point.  The only way to effectively overcome this is to engage 
sufficient manpower and manage the process with clear deadlines to 
deal efficiently with stakeholder feedback.  Therefore, at the workshop 
that followed the consultation procedure a number of representative 
stakeholders were pre-selected and had to be extremely brief and 
concise in their comments.111 
European Patent Office cover broad policy questions: “How might IP regimes evolve by 2025?” 
and “What global legitimacy might such regimes have?”  Id.  The European Patent Office’s 
“Scenarios for the Future” report aimed at encouraging strategic conversation among a wide 
range of stakeholders.  Id.  The document was written in lay terms in order to reach a wide 
audience.  Four scenarios are presented: Market Rules (business), Whose Game? (geopolitical), 
Trees of Knowledge (societal) and Blue Skies (technological).  Id.  They were developed by the 
European Patent Office scenario builders, but they reflect—as far as possible—different 
perspectives obtained through interviews.  Id. 
 110 See Ingrid Schneider, Can Patent Legislation Make A Difference? Bring Parliaments and 
Civil Society into Patent Governance?, in POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
CONTESTATION OVER THE OWNERSHIP, USE AND CONTROL OF KNOWLEDGE 129-57 (Sebastian 
Haunss & Kenneth Shadlen eds., 2011) (examining the effect of the European governance process 
on the inclusion of a broader civil society). 
 111 Indeed, an examination of the agenda for the public hearing demonstrates a substantial 
number of scheduled speeches and presentations.  See Public Hearing: Speechs and PPT 
Presentations, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Sept. 1, 2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_ 
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2.  Consequences at the Administrative Node 
Dynamic patent governance has had two key consequences within 
the context of the executive node.  First, like their legislative 
counterparts, primary examining agencies have begun to engage in 
significant experimentation as to widening institutionalized access for 
third party participation in patent decision-making, in light of the 
increasing demand for greater decision-making accountability.  Second, 
examining agencies have begun to compete with secondary actors in 
launching relevant policy initiatives within the patent regime. 
Examining agencies have experimented with a variety of 
participatory mechanisms.  At the most basic level, examining agencies 
have begun to strengthen their “transparency” mechanisms that provide 
access to information about the issuance of patents and their associated 
procedures.  These transparency mechanisms have taken a variety of 
different forms.  First, agencies have strengthened formal “publication” 
requirements as to the application and their relevant prosecutions.  In 
particular, agencies have strengthened access to the files associated with 
the entire prosecution process, as well as the opinions issued by 
examiners and internal reviewers.  This has prompted a significant 
empirical assessment of patent practice.  Second, agencies have 
experimented with “informal” transparency mechanisms.  For example, 
in 2010 the USPTO, under the leadership of the current commissioner 
David Kappos, started a blog by agency officials that aims to provide 
greater transparency to the regulated public.112  This practice was  
“copied” by the EPO in 2011.113  Moreover, the USPTO initiated 
another informal “transparency” mechanism, the Ombudsman Pilot 
Program, which is designed to enhance the application process for 
patentees by providing assistance for problems that may arise during 
prosecution.114  This new tool could become even more relevant if the 
Ombudsman Program could not only assist applicants but also make 
itself available for feedback from the public on a broader range of 
issues. 
Agencies have also tested strengthened “deliberative” mechanisms 
that include “open” third-party participation at the initial stage of review 
market/indprop/patent/hearing_speeches_en.htm. 
 112 Director’s Forum: David Kappos’ Public Blog, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
http://www.uspto.gov/blog/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2011). 
 113 The President of the European Patent Office also launched a blog.  See, e.g., President’s 
Blog, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE (Apr. 05, 2011), http://blog.epo.org/?banner=homepage. 
 114 Ombudsman Pilot Program, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/ 
patents/ombudsman.jsp (last visited Feb. 26, 2011). 
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of a patent.  While many examining agencies permit third parties to 
participate in review of a patent, it is often in a somewhat “closed” 
manner that is limited to an observational role.  For example, at the 
EPO, third parties may present observations concerning the patentability 
of a published European application.115  Moreover, they can present 
written statements during the course of proceedings before the Board of 
Appeal.116  However, no certainty exists that these statements will 
influence the outcome of the application, as the Board can address these 
statements as it thinks fit.117  In practice, the Board generally takes such 
observations into consideration. 
Recent innovations, however, have sought to create “open” 
participation by third parties in the examination of the patent itself.  
Stakeholder participation is at the core of the community patent review 
(CPR) pilot projects in Japan118 and the “peer to patent” pilot at the 
USPTO.119  These projects invite the scientific community to provide 
comments on patent applications (e.g., through patent Wikis), for the 
purpose of creating an open review process for patent prior art.  
Notably, while both sets of mechanisms are most likely to be used by 
the traditional epistemic communities, as a result of these changes they 
can now be used by any participant, and thus, are not predicated upon 
such epistemic participation. 
The innovations adopted by the examining agencies may be a 
response to the second consequence of dynamic patent governance at 
the executive level: the competition of secondary actors to conduct 
relevant policy initiatives within the patent regime.  The rise of 
secondary actors can be attributed to the failure or lack of power of 
examining agencies to respond to the arguments of various patent 
activist networks. 
Secondary agencies can be more responsive in two significant 
 115 European Patent Convention, supra note 44, art. 115(1). 
 116 Decision of the Administrative Council of 7 December 2006 Approving Amendments to 
the Rules of Procedure of the Enlarged Board of Appeal of the European Patent Office, art. 
11b(1), 2007 O.J. EPO 303, 308, http://archive.epo.org/epo/pubs/oj007/05_07/05_3037.pdf. 
 117 Id. 
 118 TOKKYOCH? [JAPAN PATENT OFFICE (JPO)], KOMYUNITEI PATENTO REBYU NI KANSU RU 
CHOUSAKENKYUU [RESEARCH ON COMMUNITY PATENT REVIEW] (2010), http://www.jpo.go.jp/s 
hiryou/toushin/chousa/zaisanken.htm#2001.  The latest developments associated with this project 
are referred to as “peer to patent Japan.” Peer to Patent Japan (P2PJ), INST. OF INTELL. PROP 
(2009), http://www.iip.or.jp/e/e_p2pj/. 
 119 For more information on the USPTO’s pilot project, see Peer to Patent: Community Patent 
Review, PEER TO PATENT, http://www.peertopatent.org (last visited Aug. 10, 2010).  See also 
Beth S. Noveck, “Peer to Patent:” Collective Intelligence, Open Review, and Patent Reform, 20 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123 (2006). 
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ways.  First, secondary actors can be more responsive in their 
ideological functions.  For example, acting in their expertise capacity, 
authorities in charge of monitoring competition in the market have 
viewed settlement agreements between pharmaceutical and generic 
competitors and patent clusters quite skeptically.120  Second, secondary 
actors can offer additional amenable avenues for public participation, in 
order to respond to pressure from the patent community. 
IV. DYNAMIC PATENT GOVERNANCE: THE MYRIAD EXAMPLE 
We have proposed a complex model for new patent governance, 
but its real measure as an effective model is based on its usefulness as a 
way to explain the complex reality underlying the current patent regime.  
We believe that—although this case is already widely discussed as to its 
merits—the Myriad debates in the United States and Europe are 
particularly useful in demonstrating the emerging contours of patent 
governance in two key respects.  Initially, the Myriad debates in both 
jurisdictions offer sharp contrasts in how to successfully incorporate the 
maturing patent civil society into patent governance.  Furthermore, the 
Myriad debates offer an example of how to manage ongoing 
heterogeneity within the institutional design of the formal dimension of 
patent law. 
A. The Myriad Example, Lesson One: A Maturing Patent Civil Society 
Needs “Doors” to Knock On 
The Myriad debates will be remembered as instrumental in the 
assessment of how a maturing patent civil society can participate in 
patent decision-making in a dynamic civil society, (in both the United 
States and Europe). Indeed, a comparative assessment reveals that 
interest groups in Europe effectively participated in challenging the 
Myriad patents far earlier than in the United States.  In the United States 
the available formal methods for third-party participation are more 
limited than in Europe.  Therefore, ongoing participation in patent 
decision-making is far less certain.  In both jurisdictions, an interesting 
tension has emerged between the availability of third-party review at the 
internal administrative review stage and a subsequent invalidity review 
at the external review stage. 
In Europe, the controversy regarding Myriad’s patents started 
early.  In 2002, three patents based on the genes BRCA1 and BRCA2121 
 120 See e.g., Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry, supra note 64. 
 121 European Patent No. 0705902 (BRCA1) (filed Aug. 11, 1995); European Patent No. 
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and a fourth patent,122 relating to a method for diagnosing breast and 
ovarian cancer were granted to Myriad Genetics.  In response, a wide 
variety of stakeholders123 launched an opposition proceeding under 
Article 99 of the EPC, and an appeal under Article 106 of the EPC.  As 
a result of these proceedings, the scope of all patents has been 
significantly reduced.  For instance, European Patent No. 0699754, on a 
method for diagnosing a predisposition for breast and ovarian cancer, 
which covered a broad variety of methods and mutations, now only 
covers a diagnostic method for a specific type of mutation, namely 
“frameshift mutations.”124 
The outcome of the Myriad debates in Europe offers some crucial 
lessons as to why the role of the civil society (as opposed to a more 
0705903 (BRCA1) (filed Aug. 11, 1995); European Patent No. 0785216 (BRCA2) (filed Dec. 17, 
1996).  See generally Bibliographic Data: EP 0785216 (A1), EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, 
http://worldwide.espacenet.com/publicationDetails/biblio?DB=EPODOC&adjacent=true&locale 
=en_T1&FT=D&date=19970723&CC=EP&NR=0785216A1&KC=A1 (last updated Apr. 04, 
2011).  European Patent No. 0705902 related to “Nucleic acid probes comprising a fragment of 
the 17q-linked breast and ovarian cancer susceptibility gene” and was granted on 11/28/2001; 
opposition was filed in August 2002; appeal against the decision in opposition was filed on 
11/15/2005 (T1213/05) but was rejected on 09/27/2007.  The patent is maintained as amended in 
opposition.  Id.  European Patent No. 0705903 related to “Mutations in the 17q-linked breast and 
ovarian cancer susceptibility gene” and was granted on 05/23/2001; opposition was filed in 
February 2002; an appeal was lodged on 08/01/2005 (T0666/05) and led to a considerable 
limitation of the scope of the patent (11/14/2008).  Id.  European Patent No. 0785216 related to 
“Chromosome 13-linked breast cancer susceptibility gene BRCA2” and was granted on 
01/08/2003; opposition was filed on 10/08/2003 and led to the decision that the patent will be 
maintained in amended form (B2 New Specification of the European patent on 06/07/2006).  Id.  
For more information also see SmartSearch, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, https://register.epoline. 
org/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2011) (providing a search tool to find information about patents 
registered with the European Patent Office). 
 122 European Patent No. 0699754 (BRCA1). European Patent No. 0699754 related to a 
“Method for diagnosing a predisposition for breast and ovarian cancer” and was granted on 
10/01/2001; opposition was filed in October 2001; appeal against the decision in opposition was 
filed on 01/14/2005 (T0080/05).  See EP 0699754 – Method for Diagnosing a Predisposition for 
Breast and Ovarian Cancer, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, https://register.epo.org/espacenet/applic 
ation?number=EP95305602&tab=main (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).  In opposition the patent was 
revoked, but in the appeal initiated by the applicant, the European Patent Office allowed the 
applicant to reformulate the invention resulting in an amendment of the original patent, which 
now only covers a diagnostic method for a specific type of mutation, namely frameshift 
mutations.  Id. 
 123 Some important stakeholders who participated in the initial Myriad disputes were e.g. the 
State of The Netherlands (in particular, its Department of Health, Welfare and Sports), Institut 
Curie, Assistance Publique-Hopitaux de Paris, Institut Gustave Roussy-IGR, Associazione 
Angelaserra per la Ricerca sul Cancro, the Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz (SP Schweiz), 
Greenpeace, a number of individuals (die Erben von Herrn Dr. Wilhelms, Rolf E.), the Belgian 
Society of Human Genetics, and the “Vereniging van Stichtingen Klinische Genetica.  See supra 
note 121; see also supra note 122. 
 124 European Patent No. 0699754 (filed Oct. 2001). 
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narrowly focused epistemic community) has emerged in Europe.  The 
internal opposition and appeal procedures of the EPC are structured so 
that “any” person may challenge the validity of a patent on broad 
terms.125  Thus, the internal administrative review of the EPC provides 
European “patent civil society” with the opportunity to participate in 
patent policy-making.  Additionally, at this internal administrative 
review stage, the Myriad experience demonstrated that patent civil 
society is increasingly comfortable with the use of epistemic tactics.  
These relevant groups focused on the general patentability requirements 
(novelty and inventive step) in their challenge to the patents issued by 
the EPO, thus demonstrating that within Europe, these civil society 
advocacy groups are not limited by the complexity and technicality of 
patent law and use the available “epistemic” tools to fight controversial 
patents. 
Achieving goals through external review of patents, though, has 
not been as simple in Europe.  After the patent grant or the maintenance 
of the patent—potentially in amended form—the opportunity to 
challenge the patents in invalidity procedures before national courts 
remains open.  However, the only opportunity to challenge a patent is to 
undertake external review of a patent in each individual member state of 
the European Patent Organization where the patent has been validated.  
This prompts a risk that different national courts will come to different 
conclusions as to the validity of each given patent.  A number of groups, 
active in the EPO opposition proceedings, have suggested initiating 
invalidity proceedings on the national level in order to address the 
uncertain state of validity of the Myriad patents.126  Apart from this 
uncertainty at the national level due to the institutional framework of the 
European Patent Organization, at least two national courts have referred 
preliminary questions127 to the European Union Court of Justice in two 
cases relating to the EU Biotechnology Directive.  This directive 
harmonizes the grant of patents in the biotech sector and has been 
 125 Id. art. 107 (“Any party to proceedings adversely affected by the decision may appeal.”); 
European Patent Convention, supra note 44, art. 99 (“Within nine months of the publication of 
the mention of the grant of the European patent in the European Patent Bulletin, any person may 
give notice to the European Patent Office of opposition to that patent, in accordance with the 
Implementing Regulations.”). 
 126 Correspondence between the authors and G. Matthijs, Professor of the Faculty of Medicine 
and Head of the Laboratory for Molecular Diagnosis, Department of Human Genetics, The 
University of Leuven (Jan. 2010) (on file with authors).  G. Matthijs has been heavily involved in 
the European opposition proceedings on behalf of the Belgian Society of Human Genetics. 
 127 Case C-34/10, Brüstle v. Greenpeace (pending); Case C-428/08, Monsanto Tech. LLC v. 
Cefetra BV et al., 2011 F.S.R. 6. 
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incorporated into the EPC implementing rules.128  Even though these 
preliminary questions do not directly relate to human gene patents, the 
preliminary rulings may create momentum to re-open the debate on the 
desirability of gene patents in general. 
By contrast, when compared to Europe, the experience of patent 
civil society in the United States still remains underdeveloped.  It was 
not until May 2009 that any significant challenge to the Myriad patents 
emerged.  Members of the patent civil society were unable to utilize 
internal administrative avenues such as the current Patent Act to 
challenge the Myriad patents, because third parties are unable to oppose 
the grant of a patent under U.S. law (as was the case in Europe).129 
The Myriad debate commenced as an invalidity challenge brought 
by the American Civil Liberties Union and the Public Patent Foundation 
at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, along with a number of 
other plaintiffs (individual patients, patient groups, physicians, 
academic researchers and medical societies).130  These plaintiffs filed a 
complaint, claiming in part that isolated nucleic acids are not patentable 
subject matter, as they are products of nature and thus contrary to 35 
U.S.C. § 101, which specifies what constitutes eligible subject matter 
under the Patent Act of 1952.131  On March 29, 2010 (with an amended 
opinion issued on April 5, 2010), the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York held that the composition and method 
claims directed to DNA molecules possessing nucleotide sequences that 
translate BRCA1 and BRCA2 proteins are “products of nature”132 or 
“abstract ideas” under Section 101 of the Patent Act. 133 
While the substantive holding of Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. 
USPT has been widely reported,134 an earlier denial of a motion to 
dismiss, which granted standing to the “public interest” plaintiffs, is of 
equal importance.  In its decision to deny the motion to dismiss,135 the 
 128 Directive 98/44/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the 
Legal Protection of Biotechnical Inventions, arts. 1, 5, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 13 (EU). 
 129 U.S. patent law does not encompass an opposition procedure.  The closest equivalent to the 
European opposition procedure, is the inter partes reexamination procedure in U.S. patent law.  
However, the grounds for reexamination are more limited than those in European opposition 
proceedings. 
 130 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F.Supp.2d 181 (S.D.N.Y 2010), as 
amended (Apr 05, 2010). 
 131 Id.; 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 132 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 237-38. 
 133 Id. 
 134 See, e.g., Danny Thompson, Myriad Genetics Can’t Patent a Human Gene, SLATE (Apr. 7, 
2010, 11:34 AM), http:///www.slate.com/id/2250082/. 
 135 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 669 F.Supp.2d 365 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
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district court held that the plaintiffs had standing because: (1) the 
statutory scheme of the Patent Act did not divest the plaintiffs of 
standing to pursue their constitutional claims;136 (2) the plaintiffs 
suffered a fairly traceable injury because Myriad had refused to license 
its patents;137 and (3) the plaintiffs’ injury could be redressed because 
the policies of the USPTO led to the unwarranted issuance of the 
patents at issue.138  This is a significant shift from previous precedent 
that suggested that the statutory scheme of the Patent Act precluded any 
judicial relief associated with the USPTO’s issuance of a patent.139  The 
outcome of the Myriad case, in Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPT, 
indicates the success of a maturing U.S. patent civil society, and the 
potential to expand access to judicial review by building a creditable 
case for standing.The intense interest in Myriad demonstrates a desire to 
create a patent law amenable to the claims of interests beyond those of 
the patentee and its direct competitors.  The ongoing interest in Myriad 
is also evinced by the unlikely set of parties that submitted amicus 
curiae briefs in the Myriad appeal currently before the Federal Circuit.  
The unlikely allies that submitted supportive briefs included the Cancer 
Council of Australia,140 the American Medical Association,141 
Universities Allied for Essential Medicines,142 Friends of the Earth,143 
 136 Id. at 385.  The plaintiffs were also able to survive a challenge to the district court’s 
exercise of subject-matter jurisdiction because the court determined that their claim was valid 
because federal district courts exercise subject-matter jurisdiction in “all civil actions arising 
under the Constitution.”  Id. at 382.  Such a claim was possible because the Patent Act contained 
no remedy for the violation of constitutional rights that had accompanied the issuance of the 
disputed patents.  Id. at 383.  This holding was significant in light of precedent that emphasized 
that the statutory scheme of the Patent Act precluded the exercise of subject-matter jurisdiction.  
Id.  It should be noted that the court did not address how an issuance of a patent can lead to an 
unconstitutional result.  See id. 
 137 Id. at 385. 
 138 Id. 
 139 See, e.g., Syntex (U.S.A.) Inc. v. USPTO, 882 F.2d 1570, 1572-74 (Fed. Cir. 1989) 
(statutory scheme of the Patent Act precluded a private judicial remedy for statutory violations by 
the USPTO). 
 140 Brief for Cancer Council Australia and Luigi Palombi as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Affirmance, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F.Supp.2d 181 (S.D.N.Y 2010), 
appeal docketed, No. 2010-1406 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 29, 2010), 2010 WL 5306807. 
 141 Brief for American Medical Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs -
Appellees and Arguing for Affirmance, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F.Supp.2d 
181 (S.D.N.Y 2010), appeal docketed, No. 2010-1406 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 6, 2010), 2010 WL 
5306806 
 142 Brief for Universities Allied for Essential Medicines as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, Supporting Affirmance, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 
F.Supp.2d 181 (S.D.N.Y 2010), appeal docketed, No. 2010-1406 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 20, 2011), 2011 
WL 585708. 
 143 Brief for the International Center of Technology Assessment et al. as Amicus Curiae in 
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the March of Dimes Foundation,144 the American Association of 
Retired Persons,145 the Southern Baptist Convention,146 and the 
National Women Health Network.147  The number and broad range of 
parties that submitted briefs in support of the decision of the district 
court not only evinces the important legal and factual questions Myriad 
presents as to the scope of Section 101, but also its status as a case that 
demonstrates the increasingly diverse participation of p
ty. 
Nevertheless, the ongoing appeal of this decision (on all grounds), 
creates uncertainty as to the ultimate impact of Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology v. USPT, and indicates the limits of creditable patent civil 
society opposition in the United States.  This is especially true in light 
of the uphill battle that patent civil society still faces in establishing 
standing before the Federal Circuit.148  This contrasts sharply with 
recent developments in Europe, where the ability of third parties to 
broadly challenge patents has proven to be a use
sson Two: M
“Thicket” 
The Myriad example also highlights how the increasing 
heterogeneity of the formal dimension in patent law has transformed the 
policymaking landscape.  Notably, the questions at stake in cases such 
as Myriad—the patenting of gene patents and their associated testing 
regimes—raise significant ethical and public health concerns.  These 
concerns have prompted secondary agencies, with expertise in these 
Support of Plaintiff-Appellees, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F.Supp.2d 181 
(S.D.N.Y 2010), appeal docketed, No. 2010-1406 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 20, 2011), 2011 WL 585709. 
 144 Brief for Amici Curiae Canavan Foundation et al. in Support of Plaintiffs for Affirmance, 
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F.Supp.2d 181 (S.D.N.Y 2010), appeal docketed, 
No. 2010-1406 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 20, 2011), 2011 WL 585710. 
 145 Brief for AARP as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees and Arguing for 
Affirmance, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F.Supp.2d 181 (S.D.N.Y 2010), 
appeal docketed, No. 2010-1406 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 20, 2011), 2011 WL 585711. 
 146 Brief for the Southern Baptist Convention as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-
Appellees and Arguing for Affirmance, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F.Supp.2d 
181 (S.D.N.Y 2010), appeal docketed, No. 2010-1406 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 20, 2011), 2011 WL 
585712. 
 147 Brief of Amici Curiae [of] the National Women’s Health Network et al. in Support of 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F.Supp.2d 181 (S.D.N.Y 
2010), appeal docketed, No. 2010-1406 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 20, 2011), 2011 WL 598420. 
 148 Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 925-932 (1991)(limiting standing to 
for a variety of interest groups that sought to challenge an administrative determination of the 
USPTO under the Patent Act and the Administrative Procedure Act). 
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areas, to assert their competence.  For instance, in 2002 the United 
States Secretary of Health and Human Services established the 
Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health and Society 
(SACGHS) to examine “current patent policy and licensing practices for 
their impact on access to genetic technologies.”149  The membership of 
the Committee has to include at least two members who “shall be 
specifically selected for their knowledge of consumer issues and 
concerns and the view and perspectives of the general public.”150  In 
April 2010, the Committee composed of fourteen members, published 
its final report on patent licensing and genetic testing, which included 
recommendations that would: (1) support the creation of exemptions for 
infringement in the case of diagnostic testing; (2) promote the 
adherence to norms of access in genetic testing; (3) suggest more 
transparency in genetic testing licensing; (4) establish an advisory body 
on the health impacts of genetic patents and provide expertise to the 
USPTO on genetic testing issues; and (5) ensure equitable patient 
access to clinically useful genetic tests.151  In response, Kathleen 
Sebelius, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, issued a 
restrained statement on July 2, 2010, which emphasized the 
commitment of the United States in maintaining “a competitive position 
in life science research and development.”152  In a curious move
etary Sebelius then dismantled the Committee in October 2010.153 
The Committee’s designated responsibilities and its ultimate report 
indicates how heterogeneous forums for patent policymaking can be 
useful in questioning general assumptions underlying patent law and the 
impact of patent law in particular fields.  Such forums have a designated 
objective that is intersectional in nature.  This intersectional focus can 
shift the ideological conception of patent law into new directions by 
incorporating diverse policy rationales.  In its report, SACGHS 
 149 Establishment of the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health and Society, 67 
Fed. Reg. 65, 126 (October 23, 2002). 
 150 67 Fed. Reg. at 127. 
 151 SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH AND POL’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH 
AND HUMAN SERV’S., LICENSING PRACTICES AND THEIR IMPACT ON PATIENT ACCESS TO 
GENETIC TESTS 4-6 (2010), http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/sacghs/reports/SACGHS_patents_report_ 
2010.pdf (including at least one dissent and abstention). 
 152 Letter from Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., to Steven Teutsch, 
Chairman of the Sec’y’s Advisory Comm. on Genetics, Health and Pol’y (July 2, 2010), 
http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/sacghs/reports/Secretarys%20letter%20to%20%20SACGHS%20on%0 
Patents%20Report.pdf. 
 153 E-Mail from SACGHS [Sec’y’s Advisory Comm. on Genetics, Health and Pol’y] 
(NIH/OD/OSP), to Daniel Vorhaus, (Sept. 27, 2010, 3:08 PM EST), http://www.genomicslawrep 
ort.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/SACHGS-Email.pdf. 
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emphasized the importance of ongoing research, ethical and public 
health rationales, which offered a distinctly critical viewpoint of 
traditional patent norms.154  Therefore, we believe the potential 
utilization of actors such as SACGHS to advise the USPTO 
demonstrates a commitment to changing the debate over gene patents 
by broadening the institutional competence of other agencies to address 
the issues associated with gene patents.  An organization such as 
SACGHS can hence function as an alternative super-structural node 
within the dynamic patent governance context.  The question of 
institutional competence to address issues related to the public interest 
may continue to foster a heterogeneous and dynamic interrelated 
landscape in the patent governance system.  The emergence of 
heterogeneous administrative forums in the United States appears in 
many respects to be a positive development for patent governance, as 
diverse ideological and ins
ikely to be generated. 
By contrast, the policy tension over the relevant ideological issues 
at stake in Myriad demonstrates the ways in which the heterogeneity of 
the administrative landscape is much more complicated for patent 
governance in Europe.  Within the European context, the heterogeneity 
of institutions with conflicting policy goals may lead to difficulties in 
ascertaining who has the institutional competence to address the policy 
issues at stake in Myriad.  The patent system of the European Union 
differs from the United States patent governance system, among other 
things, in that the European patent system consists of two independent 
institutional pillars: the European Patent Organization (including the 
EPO and the Administrative Council), on the one hand, and the 
European Union, on the other hand.  The EPO retains its own ability to 
make significant policy choices during the grant and issuance of a given 
patent, along with the broader power of its Administrative Council to 
issue and amend regulations that implement the basic treaty 
provisions.155  Policy governance is further complicated by the fact that 
the European Union (through the legislative procedures set for the 
European Commission, Council of the European Union and the 
European Parliament), also has power, to a certain extent, to issue 
regulations and directives that reflect its priorities.  For instance, 
 154 SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH AND POL’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH 
AND HUMAN SERV’S., supra 151, at 72-85 (discussing multiple legal frameworks for the 
assessment of genetic testing). 
 155 European Patent Convention, supra note 44, art. 33. 
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unitary EU patent for a long.156 
An additional consideration for the European Union is the proper 
functioning of its internal market in order to prevent trade barriers that 
may arise as a result of legal action taken in various Member States.  
Indeed, in 1998 the European Union issued its Biotechnology Directive, 
which sought to harmonize how each of its Member States protected 
biotechnological inventions.  The European Union directed its Member 
States to protect biotechnological inventions, including isolated gene 
sequences.157  It is notable, that—although the EPO is not formally 
bound by EU legislation—the Directive has explicitly been incorporated 
into the EPC158 and now provides the EPO with more detailed 
guidelines with regard to the patenting of biotechnological 
inventions.159  Finally, the Court of Justice of the European Union has 
begun to assert its own role in shaping the policy landscape of the 
European Union through its review of the parameters of the EU 
Biotechnology Directive in Monsanto.160 
Thus, in many respects, the example of Myriad, and the related 
debates over the scope of gene patenting in the European Union, reveal 
the potential for a “heterogeneity thicket:” the existence of so many 
administrative actors that stakeholders may not be able to ascertain how 
to approach the various policies instituted by these actors.161  Indeed, 
the European Society of Human Genetics (ESHG), one of the primary 
critics of the approval of the Myriad patents in Europe, has stressed that 
the “heterogeneity thicket” remains an important public policy concern 
in the European Union, noting that: 
In many countries, patent issues are dealt by the Ministry of Justice, 
even though the consequences affect the Ministry of Health.  This 
dilemma represents the origin of some of the identified problems in 
this report.  Discussion between these ministries is necessary. 
 156 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Decision Authorizing Enhanced 
Cooperation in the Area of the Creation of Unitary Patent Protection, COM (2010) 0790 final 
(Dec. 14, 2010). 
 157 Directive 98/44/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the 
Legal Protection of Biotechnical Inventions, supra note 128, art. 5. 
 158 Implementing Regulations to the Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Dec. 13, 
2006, pt. II, ch. V, r. 26(1) (“Directive 98/44/EC of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection of 
biotechnological inventions shall be used as a supplementary means of interpretation.”). 
 159 T-272/95 In re Howard Florey Inst. of Experimental Physiology and Med. (23 Oct. 2002) 
(EPO Bd. App.), http://legal.european-patent-office.org/dg3/pdf/t950272eu2.pdf. 
 160 See supra note 127. 
 161 See S. Aymé, G. Matthijs, & S. Soini, Patenting and Licensing, in Genetic Testing: 
Recommendations of the European Soc’y of Human Genetics, 16 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS S3 
(2008). 
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A better separation between the courts (such as the proposed 
European Patent Court) and the EPO is desirable, notably 
considering that EPO is at present not formally accountable to any 
other body in the EU.162 
The ESHG’s recommendation illuminates the dilemma of 
European patent heterogeneity, insofar as its structure has yet to find an 
optimal balance between centralization and diversity.  Indeed, this is 
unlikely to change anytime soon as the latest proposals for a centralized 
European and EU Patent Court have been stalled, (temporarily), by the 
EU Court of Justice163 because of their incompatibility with the EU 
Treaty and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU). 
V. THE CHALLENGES OF DYNAMIC PATENT GOVERNANCE 
We have outlined the contours of dynamic network governance in 
patent law, and considered its real-world implications in the Myriad 
debates.  In many ways, however, dynamic governance remains a 
maturing concept in patent law.  Indeed, implementing the concept of 
dynamic patent governance will raise significant challenges in the 
system governing patent law.  First, dynamic patent governance 
challenges the impulse to centralize patent administration and litigation 
so as to create largely uniform systems of law.  Second, a dynamic 
patent governance environment may risk exacerbating administrative 
inefficiencies within the patent system. 
A.  Dynamic Patent Governance and the Question of Centralization 
and Diversity in Patent Law 
The emergence of dynamic patent governance as a model seems to 
complicate a key concern of institutional design in administrative patent 
law: whether to centralize the judicial and administrative functions of 
the patent system.  The United States’ successful concentration of 
centralized appellate review in the Federal Circuit has prompted 
consideration, in the European Union, of specialized community-wide 
 162 Id. at S9. 
 163 On July 2, 2010, Advocate General Juliane Kokott provided an opinion advising the Court 
of Justice to find that, in its current draft, the proposed agreement is incompatible with EU treaty 
obligations.  C-01/09 [Op. of Advocate Gen.], Avis au titre de l’art. 300, CE – Relations 
Exterieures at para. 6 (July 2, 2010).  On March 8, 2011, the Court of Justice issued an opinion 
that largely agreed with the Advocate General’s position.  Opinion 01/09 of the Court, EUR. CT. 
OF JUSTICE. (Mar. 8, 2011), available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/ (type “08/03/2011” 
in the “from” bar; then click on “Avis 1/09” hyperlink). 
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trial and appellate level patent review.164  Likewise, as heterogeneity 
has blossomed within the context of the administrative function of the 
patent system, centralization has also developed as an alternative to the 
potential problem of a “heterogeneity thicket.”  In both cases, 
proponents of centralization claim it brings a perceived uniformity in 
application of patentability standards, and therefore more clearly 
defined intellectual property rights. 
How then does the proposed model respond to the current impulse 
for centralized governance within patent law?  We make two claims.  
First, we think that fluidity between the informal and formal dimensions 
of patent law may have the unintended consequence of generating 
alternative forums for review of issued patents and related policy 
questions.  Second, a model based on dynamic patent governance 
suggests that, in the institutional design of the patent system, it might be 
helpful to perceive centralization and diversity as a continuum of design 
choices, rather than an either/or dichotomy. 
1. The Challenge of Centralization and “Unintended” Alternative 
Forums 
Recently, the usefulness of centralized patent appellate review in 
the United States, (which has served as a model for the proposed 
centralization of external review within Europe and other patent 
systems), has been criticized.  John Duffy and Craig Nard165 advocate 
for a “polycentric” decision-making model, with the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit joined by a second appellate circuit.  Such 
polycentric decision-making would be beneficial, according to Duffy 
and Nard, because it would create doctrinal competition in articulating 
jurisprudential standards and encourage more innovative jurisprudence 
to resolve difficult doctrinal issues of claim construction.166  This has 
prompted written responses from scholars such as Judge Lee Plager and 
Lynne Pettigrew,167 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss168 and Lee 
 164 Progress Report Enhancing the Patent System in Europe, Doc. No. 14970/08 (2008), 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st15/st15674.en08.pdf. 
 165 Duffy & Nard, supra note 50, at 1623. 
 166 Id. at 1626-27. 
 167 Plager and Pettigrew contend that Duffy and Nard’s polycentric decision-making 
incorrectly predicts that more polycentric decision-making will produce “better” decisions and 
moreover, disagree with Duffy and Nard’s overall contention that judicial decisions, are a vehicle 
for policy directives.  S. Jay Plager & Lynne E. Pettigrew, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity 
Principle: A Response to Nard and Duffy, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1735, 1739 (2007). 
 168 Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit Comes of 
Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 823 (2008) (suggesting that incremental changes, rather than 
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Petherbridge,169 offering defenses of centralization within patent 
governance. 
The debate over uniformity within appellate policy determinations 
often depends on an either/or dichotomy.  Either a singular appellate 
court exists that makes determinations related to patent law, or a dual 
appellate court (in the Duffy/Nard formulation) is an ideal position to 
undertake such decision-making.  In a dynamic environment, however, 
it is possible to see already existent alternative appellate avenues in 
which different perspectives on patent law can be addressed. 
A current example is the ability of pre-existing alternative 
appellate review within those cases that fall at the intersection of patent 
and antitrust pleadings.  For example, the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit, in In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation 
(In re DDAVP), recently addressed the  “novel question of standing that 
lies at the junction of antitrust and patent law.”170  In re DDAVP 
involved the efforts of a class of direct purchasers of the anti-diuretic 
DDAVP who argued that the defendants violated Section Two of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act.  Specifically, the direct purchasers alleged that 
the defendants engaged in an exclusionary scheme under Section Two: 
(1) to procure the DDAVP patent by engaging in inequitable conduct; 
(2) to improperly list the fraudulently obtained patent in the FDA’s 
Orange Book, thereby enabling patent infringement claims against 
potential infringement by competitors; (3) to prosecute sham 
infringement litigation against generic competitors; and (4) to file a 
sham citizen petition to further delay the FDA’s Approval of Barr’s 
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA).171 
The Second Circuit held that it had jurisdiction over the appeals. 
While three of the allegations did involve substantial questions of 
patentability, the fourth, which focused on the filing of a potential sham 
citizen petition at the FDA, supported a patent-independent theory of 
liability.172  The Court addressed whether the plaintiffs, as direct 
purchasers, rather than direct competitors, had standing to raise a 
Walker Process claim.173  The defendants contended that Walker 
disruptive ones such as those suggested by Duffy and Nard, are needed to resolve the issues 
raised by a “maturing” centralized court). 
 169 Lee Petherbridge, Patent Law Uniformity?, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 421 (2009) (contending 
that an empirical analysis demonstrates significant doctrinal diversity in appellate decision-
making within the Federal Circuit). 
 170 In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation, 585 F.3d 677, 682 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 171 Id. at 683. 
 172 Id. at 686-87. 
 173 Id. at 688.  In Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 
172 (1965), the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff could base a claim of antitrust injury on the 
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Process standing existed only if the party also had standing to challenge 
the patent’s validity.174  The defendants position would have limited 
standing based on direct purchases within this context because patent 
law generally reserves standing to those parties that are direct 
competitors.175  The Second Circuit, reluctant to determine whether, as 
a per se matter, direct purchasers had a right to raise a Walker Process 
claim in every case, determined that it was appropriate in this case for 
plaintiffs to have standing in order to challenge an already “tarnished 
patent.”176  The Second Circuit ultimately held that plaintiffs had 
adequately stated an antitrust claim on which relief could be granted.177 
While the standing and jurisdictional issues central to the Second 
Circuit’s opinion in In re DDAVP are likely to the be unique to the 
administrative law jurisprudence of the United States, the Second 
Circuit’s decision has resulted in the emergence of an alternative “node” 
within the patent governance network for review of patent-related 
competition issues. Such an alternative avenue of competition is also 
available in the European Union, as demonstrated by the General 
Court’s recent opinion in AstraZeneca v. European Commission 
(AstraZeneca).178  AstraZeneca, like In re DDAVP, is a case that is to a 
certain extent out of place in that, since no centralized EU patent exists, 
the courts of the European Union, sitting in Luxembourg, do not 
normally address patent-related issues.  Nonetheless, once patents 
and/or supplementary protection certificates179 are granted, the courts of 
the European Union can invoke competition law to define the 
boundaries of the patent owner’s rights. 
In AstraZeneca, the General Court upheld the decision of the 
European Commission, which had imposed a fine of € 60 million on 
AstraZeneca for abusing its dominant position by using the patent 
system and associated procedures to market pharmaceutical products 
patentee’s fraudulent behavior within the context of the acquisition of a patent. 
 174 In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation, 585 F.3d at 684. 
 175 Kali N. Murray, Rules for Radicals: A Politics of Patent Law, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 63, 
77-80 (analyzing standing of direct competitors in the post-issuance context). 
 176 In re DDAVP, 587 F.3d at 691. 
 177 Murray, supra note 175, at 77-80. 
 178 Case T-321/05, AstraZeneca v. Euro. Comm’n, unreported July 1, 2010, available at 
http://curia.europa.eu (to search for this case, follow the “en” hyperlink; then type “T-321/05” in 
the “Case No” field and click “Search”; then follow “T-321/05” hyperlink where the date “2010-
07-01” is listed). 
 179 In the EU, supplementary protection certificates operate as a sui generis extension of a 
patent that is available for medicinal products and plant protection products.  They were 
introduced to compensate for the long time required to obtain authorization to put these products 
on the market.  See Council Regulation 1768/92 of 18 June 1992 Concerning the Creation of a 
Supplementary Protection Certificate for Medicinal Products, 1992 O.J. (L 182) 1. 
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with the sole purpose of preventing or delaying the market entry of 
competitors to Losec (their anti-ulcer product), while also preventing 
parallel imports of Losec.180  According to the Commission, 
AstraZeneca had made deliberately misleading representations to the 
patent offices of Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom so as to obtain supplementary 
protection certificates for Losec that conferred extended patent 
protection.181  Moreover, the Commission sanctioned AstraZeneca for 
having de-registered the Losec capsule marketing authorizations in 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden so as to (1) delay and make more 
difficult the marketing of generic medicinal products and (2) prevent 
parallel imports of Losec.182  This was contrary to the then existing law 
that required that the marketing authorization of the original product to 
be in force in the Member State concerned in order to qualify for a 
simplified procedure.183  According to the Commission, AstraZeneca’s 
deregistration of the Losec capsule’s marketing authorizations had the 
effect of preventing the use of the simplified procedure.  This in turn 
made getting marketing authorizations for generic medicinal products 
more time-consuming and difficult, thereby delaying the entry of 
generic competitors.184  The General Court rejected most of 
AstraZeneca’s arguments for annulment of the Commission’s decision 
and held that the company had abused its dominant position, even 
though the Commission failed to prove part of its second contention.185 
Unlike the Second Circuit’s holding in In re DDAVP, under EU 
law the General Court did not have constrained jurisdictional authority 
since the Commission had imposed a fine on AstraZeneca as an exercise 
of its powers under Article 102 of the TFEU.  This was a sufficient 
ground for the Court to claim jurisdiction under Article 263 of the 
TFEU.  In this respect, AstraZeneca is not an exact parallel to In re 
DDAVP.  Nonetheless, the General Court’s holding in AstraZeneca 
illustrates that even in an utterly complex heterogeneity thicket, such as 
the European patent governance system, unintended formal actors are 
increasingly more willing to engage in review of patent-related issues.  
Technically, the courts of the European Union cannot exercise 
jurisdiction over claims involving patents granted by the EPO or 
 180 AstraZeneca, supra note 178 ¶¶ 612–13, 864. 
 181 Id. ¶ 305. 
 182 Id. ¶ 871 
 183 Id. ¶¶ 806, 808. 
 184 Commission Decision of 15 June 2005 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC 
Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement, 2006 O.J. (L 332) 24. 
 185 Id. 
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national patent offices.  However, in AstraZeneca, the General Court 
exercised its ability to review acts of the European Commission 
intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties, such as 
competition decisions (acting as an expertise actor within the 
competition law context), and placed significant limits on the behavior 
of patent owners. 
The Second Circuit’s holding in In re DDAVP and the General 
Court’s decision in Astra-Zeneca reflect what role centralization and 
diversity will likely play in judicial decision-making within a dynamic 
patent governance environment.  First, both cases demonstrate that 
diversity of judicial decision-making and restraints on patent holder’s 
behavior can occur at different nodes within the governance system 
without formal, statutory changes in the law.  Second, In re DDAVP, in 
particular, demonstrates that the existence of heterogeneous 
administrative agencies may prompt new types of challenges within the 
context of patent law.  The Second Circuit’s reliance on a potentially 
sham citizen petition as a basis for an antitrust claim demonstrates the 
increasing importance of the FDA as a site for conflict within patent 
enforcement.  The FDA, because of its review of pharmaceutical 
products, has re-shaped the patent landscape by providing 
pharmaceutical actors with a stronger incentive to engage in 
sophisticated strategies within the administrative context (such as the 
choice of whether to list a patent on the FDA’s Orange Book); and the 
litigation context (such as increasingly offering incentives to primary 
pharmaceutical companies to enter into settlements with generic 
companies).186  Finally, the role of direct purchasers in In re DDAVP 
exemplifies the involvement of a more diverse public in patent law; a 
patent “civil society” that may come to patent law from other fields 
(such as antitrust), or that may have goals that differ from direct 
competitors in asserting patent law claims.  In re DDAVP’s expansion 
of standing to bring certain claims signals the part that broader patent 
civil society can play within patent law. 
2. The Challenge of Centralization and the “Intended” Continuum of 
Institutional Design in Patent Law 
The either/or dichotomy of centralization versus decentralization 
ignores the present reality of a partially de-centralized specialized 
appellate review.  In addition, it affects reconsideration of the 
 186 See generally, Ron A. Bouchard et al., The Pas De Deux of Pharmaceutical Regulation, 24 
BERK. L. & TECH. J. 1464, 1494 (2009). 
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institutional design of existing primary and secondary actors, as well as 
proposals for new patent related actors.  Recent patent scholarship has 
begun to grapple with, (but not describe), what we identified in Part B 
as the heterogeneity thicket; the problem of too many individual actors 
seeking to regulate and enforce patents. 
The solution to problems within patent governance has often been 
to suggest more “centralized” institutional design.  For instance, Stuart 
Benjamin and Arti Rai187 recently proposed an Office of Innovation 
Policy (OIP) that would review all regulations that impact “innovation” 
in the United States.188  Pursuant to this proposal, any regulations 
related to patents, would have to be submitted to the OIP for review.  
Such centralized administrative review would be optimal, Benjamin and 
Rai contend, because decentralized policy review creates “disinformity, 
lack of focus on the regulatory objective, potentially significant 
transaction costs for regulated entities subject to a welter of different 
regimes, and significant government costs arising from so many 
regulators covering significant ground.”189  The proposed OIP would 
serve to centralize decision-making related to innovative policy in two 
key respects.190  First, the OIP would be able to issue ex ante policy 
guidelines to agencies that would be used by agencies to identify the 
impact of their decision-making on innovation.191  The agency would be 
required to include such an ex ante OIP policy determination in its 
administrative record.  Any subsequent judicial review would then be 
required to undertake searching “hard-look” review to determine 
whether or not the agency effectively considered the “innovative” 
impact of its decision-making.192  Second, consideration of OIP 
evaluation could be included in the ex post analysis undertaken by the 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in its centralized 
review of the budgetary impact of a proposed agency regulation.193 
Rai and Benjamin suggest that a future OIP could be instrumental 
in helping the executive branch create and integrate a uniform 
innovation policy among the various agencies, as well as harmonize the 
role of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches in implementing 
 187 Stuart M. Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural Perspective, 77 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 58–59 (2008). 
 188 Id. at 58. 
 189 Id. 
 190 Id. at 58-64 (dicussing the functions of the OIP). 
 191 Id. at 64. 
 192 Id. at 65. 
 193 Id. at 64. 
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that policy.194  Rai and Benjamin acknowledge, however, one 
problematic aspect of their proposed OIP, namely, its likely insulation 
from public participation and accountability structures under the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).195  Having concluded an 
empirical assessment of the public participation processes at the Federal 
Communication Commission (FCC), Benjamin and Rai contend that 
these procedures have limited value in improving innovation regulation.  
In particular, Benjamin and Rai note that comments were submitted 
“disproportionately” by well-organized groups and were often 
duplicative during informal rulemaking.196  Thus, Benjamin and Rai 
contend that participation processes within the context of FCC informal 
rulemaking are “not essential, or even particularly helpful for the 
purposes of improving innovation regulation,” and therefore would not 
be necessary for an OIP assessment.197 
While there is much to admire about Benjamin and Rai’s proposal, 
and its attempts to address an identified problem in our own model (“the 
heterogeneity thicket”), we struggle with the major flaw on which OIP 
is premised: the apparent lack of public participation that is 
contemplated as part of its design structure. 
In particular, we struggle with what centralized review without 
public participation would mean in the context of patent law.  Benjamin 
and Rai offer their critique of basic participation structures based on an 
analysis of such processes at the FCC.198  Such a reference to the FCC’s 
policy environment ignores the statutory constraints placed on public 
participation within the patent context.  The Federal Circuit’s recent 
decision in Tafas v. Doll199 signals that at least some among its bench 
would seek to place significant constraints on the ability of the USPTO 
to undertake substantive policy review (under Section 553 of the APA).  
These constraints on the USPTO’s ability to conduct substantive notice 
and comment rulemaking under Section 2 of the Patent Act limit the 
ability of the public to participate in the USPTO’s interpretative 
determinations of its statutory responsibilities.200  Substantive policy 
 194 Id. at 56. 
 195 An OIP ex ante or ex post review would not likely be considered “notice and comment” 
rule-making under Section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act.  See id. at 75; see also 
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006) (outlining requirement for “notice and 
comment” rulemaking procedures). 
 196 Benjamin & Rai, supra note 187, at 73. 
 197 Id. at 75. 
 198 Id. at 59-60. 
 199 559 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2009), vacated, 328 Fed. App’x. 658 (Fed. Cir. 2009), appeal 
dismissed 586 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 200 Kali Murray, First Things, First: A Principled Approach to Patent Administrative Law, 42 
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review is further constrained by limits on the ability of third parties, 
beyond a potentially infringing competitor, to raise pre-issuance or post-
issuance challenges to administrative decisions undertaken by the 
USPTO during the re-examination procedure.201  Moreover, new 
experimental tools created by the USPTO, such as the Peer to Patent 
Project, the Ombudsman Project, and the Director’s Blog, will not 
compensate for these shortcomings.  Strategic re-evaluation 
mechanisms such as the EPO’s Scenario’s project and large-scale 
consultations like those of the European Commission and the European 
Parliament on the future of patent policy also seem absent. 
The existence of a “public interest” community that can organize 
around the accountability structures at the USPTO or actively challenge 
the issuance of administrative rules is, therefore, very limited.  Efforts 
to further de-legitimize public participation in the patent governance 
system by proposing actors that would lack considerable opportunities 
for participation may have a deeper and lasting consequence in a 
constrained regulatory environment.  A lean, centralized, super-
structural node, such as the OIP proposed by Benjamin and Rai, can 
only serve as an acceptable model if public participation is 
appropriately guaranteed at the epistemic community and the civil 
society levels. 
Rather than emphasizing decentralization or centralization as the  
principal solution, we suggest that a model of dynamic patent 
governance offers a compromise.  A model of dynamic patent 
governance recognizes the needs for patent governance to acknowledge 
that decentralization and centralization are part of a broader continuum 
of design choices within the context of institutional design.  So, we see 
a need for a transparent network consisting of (1) decentralized formal 
actors with appropriate procedures for public participation; and (2) 
centralized review at super-structural nodes.  In this way, incoherence 
and duplication would be prevented by the centralized review 
mechanism, while at the same time access to expert advice from 
epistemic communities and from the patent civil society would be 
guaranteed at the decentralized level.  A centralized, super-structural 
node, such as Benjamin and Rai’s OIP—with ex ante and ex post 
powers to review policies related to innovation, including patent 
policy—would fit comfortably within a concept of dynamic patent 
governance that includes a variety of heterogeneous actors collaborating 
within a dynamic patent governance network.  Such an integrated 
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 29, 61-62 (2008). 
 201 Murray, supra note 175, at 77-85. 
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approach would not only be useful for the United States, but also for 
Europe, which is currently contemplating its first comprehensive 
Innovation Strategy.202 
B. Dynamic Patent Governance and the Challenge of Efficiency 
The other primary criticism of our model is that its obvious 
complexity would prompt even more administrative inefficiencies in 
patent governance.  We argue, however, that dynamic patent 
governance may offer more, rather than less, administrative efficiency 
in patent offices. 
The Trilateral Cooperation framework203 between the USPTO, the 
EPO and the JPO offers an example of how to increase efficiency by 
exploiting the strengths of a governance network in a number of ways.  
First, the USPTO, the EPO and the JPO extended the existing sets of 
bilateral Patent Prosecution Highway (PPH) work-sharing agreements 
to a “fast-track” patent examination procedure for PCT applications 
under the pilot PCT-Patent Prosecution Highway (PCT-PPH) Program.  
PCT applications that receive a positive written opinion from either the 
International Searching Authority or the International Preliminary 
Examining Authority, or an international preliminary examination 
report from EPO, JPO or USPTO are subject to an expedited 
examination.204  Second, these patent offices have engaged in the Tri-
way Pilot Program, which expedites a search in each office, if the patent 
applicant has filed with either the EPO, JPO or USPTO as its office of 
first filing under the Paris Convention.205  The Trilateral Cooperation 
framework provides a successful example of three patent offices coming 
together to expedite examination of the respective applications.  This 
practical solution to expediting applications may also herald an 
increased consistency in the legal standards of each regime.  This 
increased consistency is also reflected in the third major collaborative 
 202 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Europe 2020 
Flagship Initiative, Innovation Union, COM (2010) 546 final (Oct. 6, 2010), http://ec.europa.eu/ 
commission_2010-2014/geoghegan-quinn/headlines/documents/com-2010-546-final_en.pdf. 
 203 See generally History, THE TRILATERAL CO-OPERATION, available at  http://www.trilateral  
.net/index.html;jsessionid=j5wskyqrynla (last visited Apr. 10, 2011). 
 204 Pilot of Patent Prosecution Highway Program to use PCT Work Products, PCT 
NEWSLETTER, No. 12/2009, at 1; The Trilateral Offices commence PCT-Patent Prosecution 
Highway Pilot, PCT NEWSLETTER, No. 02/2010, at 2. 
 205 Tri-Way Pilot Program Among The United States Patent and Trademark Office, the 
European Patent Office, and the Japan Patent Office, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE 
(Jul. 28, 2008), http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/triwaypilot.html. 
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initiative between the three offices: the establishment of the Trilateral 
Biotechnology Working Group—whose mission is to faciliate similar 
practices in evolving areas of technology and patent law, with the 
ultimate goal of harmonization of practice among the Trilateral 
partners.206 
Super-structural nodes, such as national patent offices 
collaborating within the Trilateral Cooperation framework, may also 
raise some concerns despite the opportunities they present.  
Preliminarily, the patent offices, while collaborating within a 
superstructural node, must still ensure that they are operating pursuant 
to domestic administrative authority.  For instance, while the USPTO 
has entered into expedited search agreements based on its authority to 
govern the proceedings of its office under 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2),207 its 
authority to join international treaties under the same section remains 
advisory.208  Furthermore, these practices may insulate administrators 
from democratic accountability procedures, such as notice and comment 
rulemaking, or intensive consultation procedures that are open to a 
wider range of public interest groups. 
The aforementioned concerns are not so dominant when it comes 
to establishing practical procedures aimed at expediting patent grants 
and limiting backlogs.  However, for substantive policymaking projects 
these concerns appear more urgent.  Therefore, it is vital to emphasize 
that despite collaboration at the level of an international super-structural 
node, the three patent offices/nodes that are part of the Trilateral 
Cooperation framework remain individually responsible for providing 
appropriate mechanisms for accountability within their own legal 
systems.  Dynamic patent governance thus serves efficiency aims by 
facilitating and enabling collaboration by building super-structural 
nodes that fulfill new functions, while maintaining stable accountability 
mechanisms for legitimate policy-making within each individual node. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Our proposed model seeks to refine early attempts by experts such 
as Francis Gurry and James Boyle to suggest a patent governance model 
with global significance.  However, our proposed model still remains 
provisional, tentative, even.  For, as the Myriad debates demonstrate, 
“events on the ground” are driving whether our proposed model will 
 206 See Biotechnology, THE TRILATERAL CO-OPERATION, available at http://www.trilateral.net 
/projects/biotechnology.html (last visited Apr. 2011). 
 207 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2) (2010). 
 208 Id. § 2(b)(8). 
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become a fully developed one.  
Our model requires further development of its potential 
consequences and challenges.  The impact of a more dynamic system of 
patent governance—in particular on doctrinal development—still 
remains uncertain.  Subjects so long at the core of patent law—such as 
the nature of invention and what are the best legal devices to protect any 
given invention—may shift in response to interdisciplinary concerns in 
other fields.  Concerns in other fields can range from public health 
concerns over access to drugs and genetic testing; to the relationships of 
patents to food, health and safety; to the role of patent law within the 
context of competition policy.  At this stage in the development of our 
model, more questions than answers exist. 
Yet, we think that articulating our model, even at this stage, has 
some useful outcomes.  First, patent reform efforts at the legislative and 
administrative nodes may valuably benefit from conscious application 
of this model in a number of respects.  Policy-making instruments used 
on opposite sides of the Atlantic may inspire reform at the legislative 
and administrative nodes.  For instance, the USPTO could usefully 
adopt the “scenarios model” undertaken by the EPO as a way to foster a 
long-term vision for its changing role.  Congress could consider some 
more informal consultation procedures—beyond carefully staged 
testimony—where a broader spectrum of stakeholders is represented.  
The EPO could become more transparent by having an equivalent to 
peer to patent review and the Ombudsman Pilot Program.  
Second, we think that our model suggests that the institutional 
design of patent law needs to be effectively mediated between 
centralization and decentralization in the examiner and review nodes.  
In particular, institutional design needs to reflect the demands for 
increased participation of patent stakeholders (the epistemic community 
and the patent civil society alike) while safeguarding the need for 
efficient administrative governance.  
Finally, our model implies that the role of the informal dimension 
is a central element in patent governance.  The Myriad patent debates 
suggest that a wider audience is paying attention to patent governance, 
and patent administrators, by utilizing our model, can respond to the 
“voices” knocking at the door. 
So, this is not so much a conclusion, but an invitation to reflect 
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